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INTRODUCTION 
Two important topics have been the subject of continuing debate 
in contemporary international tax policy circles. The first is the recent 
trend towards increased transparency and disclosure in tax 
enforcement and the prevention of tax base erosion. The second is the 
question of how developing countries should be treated in the design 
and implementation of international tax policy. These topics have, by 
and large, evolved on parallel but separate tracks.1 This Article argues, 
however, that they have become necessarily intertwined as countries—
including developing countries—begin to implement new and revised 
measures for transparency and disclosure in international tax. This 
Article explores the impact of the contemporary transparency and 
disclosure trends from the perspective of developing countries, 
highlights the distinctive benefits and risks that confront these 
countries, and identifies the key factors that will determine whether 
participating in transparency and disclosure initiatives will ultimately 
be helpful or harmful to developing countries. 
 
 1. The United Nations has directed attention to the application of various transparency 
and disclosure policies to developing countries in the context of its broader work “aimed at 
strengthening the capacity of developing countries to increase their potential for domestic 
revenue mobilization through enhancing their ability to effectively protect and broaden their tax 
base.” UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING 
THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at viii (Alexander Trepelkov et al. eds., 2015), 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/handbook-tb.pdf. This Article, 
building on such prior work, seeks to examine in more detail how the transparency and disclosure 
trend has expanded in recent years, what assumptions underlie its structure, and what features 
of developing countries render them both potential beneficiaries of the trend but also 
potential losers. 
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As between the two topics, the trend towards increased 
transparency and disclosure in the tax arena is the more recent. This 
issue has gained increasing prominence through global work on tax-
base erosion, which culminated in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project (BEPS Project) sponsored by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) with the support of the 
G20.2 Most of the BEPS Project addressed substantive law—the tax 
rules and practices that can cause a country’s tax base to be eroded 
and profits to be shifted out of the country. But recognizing that 
improved substantive rules alone would be inadequate to protect a 
country’s tax base, the Project also explored the role of transparency 
and disclosure in designing an effective tax system. Specifically, BEPS 
Project Action 13 examined options for enhanced transparency and 
disclosure by multinational businesses (with attention to transfer 
pricing). The Final Report for BEPS Action 13 included a 
recommendation, together with a commitment by participating 
jurisdictions, that the following three items be prepared by each large 
multinational: (1) a country-by-country report, (2) a master file, and 
(3) a local file.3 The package of these three different types of disclosure 
materials was expected to improve countries’ ability to effectively 
enforce their tax rules. 
Yet, attention to the function of transparency and disclosure in 
reinforcing the tax system extends beyond the BEPS Project. Another 
major transparency and disclosure initiative, the introduction of 
automatic exchange of financial account information, has been the 
subject of recent reform efforts in the European Union (EU) and the 
OECD.4 Further examples of transparency in tax and related fields 
 
 2. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 11 (2013), 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf [hereinafter ACTION PLAN] (“The G20 
finance ministers called on the OECD to develop an action plan to address BEPS issues in a co-
ordinated and comprehensive manner.”); see also Hugh J. Ault, Wolfgang Schoen & Stephen E. 
Shay, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap for Reform, 68 BULLETIN FOR INT’L TAX’N 
275, 275–77 (2014) (explaining the context and motiviation for the BEPS project and its 
emphasis on coordinated national responses to problems of tax base erosion). 
 3. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY 
REPORTING, ACTION 13—2015 FINAL REPORT 20–21 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 13 FINAL 
REPORT], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/deliver/2315381e.pdf. 
 4. See infra Section I.A.2. 
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include steps to promote industry specific reporting,5 Tax Information 
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), the Global Forum on Transparency 
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, the rise of 
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs), and the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) in the United States.6 
The second strand in contemporary international tax policy 
discussions, a concern for the treatment of developing countries, is 
more long standing, but has continued to generate interest in recent 
years. Several critical questions arise in analyzing the application of 
 
 5. Industry specific country-by-country reporting (some of which is tax related) has 
evolved in other arenas. For example, securities law in the United States requires businesses 
engaged in extractive industries, such as the “exploration, extraction, processing, [and] export” 
of “oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the acquisition of a license for any such activity,” Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(1)(A) (2012), to report payments made to foreign 
governments, id. § 78m(q)(2)(A). The types of payments that must be reported by these 
businesses (on a country-by-country basis) “includes taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), 
production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits.” Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C)(ii). 
Implementing regulations were issued in July 2016. Disclosure of Payments by Resource 
Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359, 49,360 (July 27, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240 & 249b); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules for 
Resource Extraction Issuers Under Dodd-Frank Act (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-132.html (announcing, in June 2016, that the 
SEC adopted the implementing regulations). Another example of industry-related reporting 
requirements can be found in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which 
seeks to encourage a two-pronged strategy for transparency in extractive industries. See 
EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI FACT SHEET (2014), 
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014-07-30_EITI_Factsheet_English.pdf 
[hereinafter EITI FACT SHEET]. This approach would require businesses to report what they pay 
to each jurisdiction, and require the governments to report what they receive. See id. But work 
on industry-based disclosure has not been limited to extractive industries. The European 
Union’s Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) seeks disclosure by covered financial 
institutions of certain information on a country-by-country basis, including: “profit or loss 
before tax,” tax paid, “subsidies received,” and average number of employees. Council Directive 
2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338, 384–85 (EU). EU Members states must domestically enact 
rules to require the reporting. Press Release, European Commission, Memo: Capital 
Requirements-CRDIV/CRR–Frequently Asked Questions 6–7 (July 16, 2013), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.pdf (noting that EU Directives 
must be implemented by each member state through its domestic law). For example, United 
Kingdom reporting rules came into effect in January 2014, with the first reporting period ending 
on July 1, 2014. See The Capital Requirements (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 
2013, SI 2013/3118, art. 1, ¶ 1, art. 3, ¶¶ 1–2 (Eng.); HM TREASURY, CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS (COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING) REGULATIONS 2013: GUIDANCE §§ 
1.2, 3 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capital-requirements-country-
by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance/capital-requirements-country-by-country-
reporting-regulations-2013-guidance. 
 6. See infra Section I.A.2.c. 
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international tax policy to developing countries, including whether tax 
treaties are good for such countries,7 whether and which international 
organizations adequately represent and consider their needs, 8  and 
whether the dominant concerns of current global tax discussions 
reflect their primary concerns.9 
This Article argues that the intersection between these two topics 
needs to be more closely analyzed because, as the serious work of 
transparency and disclosure gets underway, the question of how and 
where developing countries fit into the picture has become more 
pressing. Can increased transparency and disclosure meaningfully 
assist developing countries in bolstering their tax systems? Will they be 
able to participate in this world of information exchange? If they can 
participate, on what terms and with what realistic degree of success? 
Should developing countries advocate for specific reforms to the 
emerging transparency and disclosure regimes, and if so, what 
reforms? This Article examines the current landscape of international 
tax transparency and disclosure practices that have been put in place 
or are in process, and explores the intended goals of such enhanced 
 
 7. See, e.g., Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 939, 942–
47 (2000); Antonio Hugo Figueroa, ¿Tratados Tributarios para Evitar la Doble Imposición 
Internacional o para Transferir Recursos de Países en Desarrollo a Países Desarrollados? [Tax 
Treaties to Avoid International Double Taxation or to Transfer Resources from Developing 
Countries to Developed Ones?], 2:14 VOCES EN EL FENIX 128, 130–31 (2012); Allison D. 
Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. 
L. REV. 639, 643–44 (2005). 
 8. See e.g., Press Release, Christian Aid, Rich Have More Influence than Poor over Tax 
Reform (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/november-2014/rich-have-more-
influence-than-poor-over-tax-reform.aspx (quoting Christian Aid’s Principal Economic Justice 
Adviser, Toby Quantrill, when it says that “[t]he results of the OECD’s project so far suggest 
that rich countries and multinationals may have had more influence over it than many poor 
countries”); New Reports on OECD and Developing Countries: Progress, But Far to Go, 
TAXJUSTICE.NET (Nov. 14, 2014), 
http://www.taxjustice.net/?s=OECD+and+developing+countries (positing that “[t]he 
lingering worry, of course, is always that the OECD is a club of rich countries and is still merely 
offering a veneer of representation while getting on with the business of looking after its core 
member states’ interests”). 
 9. See, e.g., Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Protecting the Tax Base of Developing 
Countries: An Overview, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN 
PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 1, at 1, 6–8; Richard 
Vann, Current Trends in Balancing Residence and Source Taxation, in BRICS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION 367, 387–92 (Yariv Brauner & Pasquale 
Pistone eds., 2015). 
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information exchange. The Article then considers what this trend 
means for developing countries, both in the short and long term. 
One important point should be noted at the outset: developing 
countries are not a single, monolithic block in terms of their needs, 
goals, and capacities. Even those countries that are frequently grouped 
together as sharing common interests, such as the “BRICS,”10 can 
look quite different in terms of their current international tax position, 
their needs, and their viable options.11 Therefore, the analysis and 
solutions may vary depending on the specific situation of the 
developing country in question. 
Part I describes the emergence of new transparency and disclosure 
practices in international tax. The most significant innovations in 
recent years are (1) the BEPS Project’s three-part reporting package 
and (2) the implementation of automatic exchange of information 
(both the EU program and the OECD’s Common Reporting 
Standard (CRS) for exchange of financial account information). 
Additionally, TIEAs, IGAs, and industry specific reporting 
requirements further reflect this trend. Part I then introduces the 
second strand in contemporary international tax policy—a focus on 
developing countries in international tax. Among the issues identified 
are the current status of developing countries in international tax, the 
impact of tax treaties and international organizations on developing 
countries, and these countries’ primary tax concerns. Part II explores 
the application of the two major transparency and disclosure regimes 
(the BEPS Action Item 13 transparency and disclosure package and 
the automatic exchange of information) in the context of developing 
countries. Part III considers the implications of global trends in tax 
transparency and disclosure for developing countries and their 
potential courses of action, arguing that the very features of 
developing countries that may make transparency and disclosure 
distinctly valuable may also be the same features that curtail their full 
participation in this emerging trend and prove prejudicial to some 
taxpayers. The conclusion identifies key emerging issues and avenues 
 
 10. Brand South Africa, New Era as South Africa Joins BRICS, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO (Apr. 
11, 2011), http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/brics-080411.htm. The BRICS includes 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Jeffrey Owens, The BRICS: An Overall Perspective (detailing the similarities 
and differences among the BRICS nations, including GDP, GDP growth rates, revenue sources, 
and corporate tax rates), in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX 
COORDINATION, supra note 9, at 353, 353–63. 
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for further research as the various transparency and disclosure 
programs commence. 
I. TWO INTERSECTING STRANDS OF INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY 
Before considering the intersection of developing countries and 
the trend towards tax transparency and disclosure, this Part provides 
a brief overview of the two strands. This overview is necessarily 
abbreviated. Extensive literature exists on developing countries and 
taxation, and the literature on international tax transparency and 
disclosure continues to grow. This Article’s goal is to identify the 
primary features and concerns with regard to each and then explore 
their intersection and the resulting implications. 
A. Transparency and Disclosure in International Tax 
Alongside global reform efforts focused on substantive tax issues, 
there has been a steady push for increased transparency, disclosure, 
and exchange of information. This trend is not entirely new. However, 
as countries and international organizations have begun to appreciate 
the importance of information in the enforcement of substantive tax 
rules, the level of interest in transparency has increased in a way that 
constitutes a notable break from the past. This Section provides an 
overview of the recent transparency and disclosure practices and 
reforms, including information exchange between governments, 
information provision by third parties, and enhanced 
taxpayer reporting.  
1. Treaties and agreements 
Concern over access to tax information emerged in the 1920s12 as 
the League of Nations sponsored work on tax treaties through an 
appointed Committee of Technical Experts.13 Ultimately, in 1927, the 
Committee produced a draft titled Bilateral Convention on 
 
 12. Prior to this work in the 1900s, Belgium negotiated two treaties that included 
exchange of information language—the first with France in 1843 and the second with the 
Netherlands in 1845. See XAVIER OBERSON, INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN 
TAX MATTERS: TOWARDS GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY 4 (2015). 
 13. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1066, 1080–81 (1997). 
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Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation.14 Under this draft, 
information would be exchanged between two jurisdictions (1) upon 
request and (2) automatically for certain types of information 
(immovable property, mortgages, industrial, agricultural and 
commercial activities, earned income and director’s fees, transferable 
securities, and estates).15 The draft model further stated that (1) a 
country could refuse to provide information on public policy grounds, 
(2)  assistance under the agreement would be without payment, and 
(3) provided information would include the taxpayer’s name, 
residence and “family responsibilit[y].”16 Although this draft was not 
finalized, the League of Nations did publish a model double tax 
treaty 17  which built on this earlier work and which served as the 
starting point for future double tax treaties.18 
a. Treaty exchange of information provisions. By the 1930s, there 
was a shift towards inclusion of exchange of information provisions in 
the standard double tax treaty.19 However, the provisions included in 
these bilateral treaties were generally less robust than those found in 
the model administrative assistance treaties, which were designed to 
serve as a stand-alone agreement for mutual assistance between 
nations in implementing their tax laws. 20 Though the inclusion of 
exchange of information in double tax treaties resulted in diluted 
language, it nonetheless made the provisions ubiquitous.21 Moving to 
the present, the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital (OECD Model) and the United Nations Model Double 
 
 14. UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS,  UNITED NATIONS MODEL 
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at xv 
(2001), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/DoubleTaxation.pdf. 
 15. OBERSON, supra note 12, at 15. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Report Presented by the General Meeting of Gov’t Experts on Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562.M.178 1928 II  (1928). 
 18. See OBERSON, supra  note 12, at 4. 
 19. See Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 605, 644–45 nn.261–62 (2008) (referencing the U.S.-Sweden 1939 Treaty and the U.S.-
France 1939 Treaty). 
 20. See id. at 645–48. 
 21. See id.; see also OBERSON, supra note 12, at 4 (“[T]he [League of Nation’s] committee 
and experts published the 1928 model double taxation treaty that would form the basis of 
bilateral treaties, which under the following works of the OECD, would form the basic structure 
of the international tax regime.”). 
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Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries 
(UN Model) both include an Article 26, which requires exchange of 
information upon request and which specifies the prerequisites for 
requesting information (e.g., the information must be foreseeably 
relevant to implementing tax laws), the conditions of use (e.g., privacy 
limits on public access), 22  and the appropriate and inappropriate 
grounds for refusing to comply.23 
b. OECD initiatives and the 2002 model TIEA. The late 1990s saw 
work done by OECD countries on the troubling question of harmful 
tax competition, as OECD countries with higher tax rates became 
concerned that countries with lower tax rates or special tax regimes 
were using their tax systems to attract mobile capital and activities.24 
The OECD—whose membership in 1998 comprised almost 
exclusively of developed countries25—ultimately produced a report on 
 
 22. See OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 2014 (FULL 
VERSION), at M-62 to M-63 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 OECD MODEL], http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2015-full-version_978
9264239081-en; UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS 
MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION 32–33 (2011) [hereinafter UN MODEL (2011)], 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Model_2011_Update.pdf. 
 23. For example, “fishing expeditions” for information are not permitted. 2014 OECD 
MODEL, supra note 22, at C(26)-3 (giving commentary on Article 26 of the OECD Model). 
Contracting States are not at liberty to engage in “fishing expeditions” or to request 
information that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. In the 
context of information exchange upon request, the standard requires that at the time 
a request is made there is a reasonable possibility that the requested information will 
be relevant; whether the information, once provided, actually proves to be relevant is 
immaterial. A request may therefore not be declined in cases where a definite 
assessment of the pertinence of the information to an ongoing investigation can only 
be made following the receipt of the information.  
Id.; see also UN MODEL (2011), supra note 22, at 439 (“Contracting States are not at liberty to 
request information about a particular taxpayer that is highly unlikely to be relevant to the tax 
affairs of that taxpayer.”). However, countries are no longer permitted to rely on domestic bank 
secrecy rules as grounds for not exchanging information under a bilateral treaty. See, e.g., 2014 
OECD MODEL, supra note 22, at M-63; UN MODEL (2011), supra note 22, at 33. 
 24. See Hugh J. Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax 
Norms, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 757, 763–72 (2009) (placing the emergence of the TIEAs and 
the Global Forum in the broader context of preceding work on harmful tax competition). 
 25. The original OECD member countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD.ORG, 
http://www.oecd.org/general/conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddev
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harmful tax competition that identified its key features and 
recommended steps to curb this conduct. 26  The harmful tax 
competition project eventually led to some changes by member and 
nonmember states, such as the elimination of harmful features of some 
tax regimes.27 Ultimately, though, the broader project stalled out and 
further formal work on tax competition per se did not continue.28 
However, this initial project on harmful tax competition led to a 
marked shift towards transparency and disclosure as a way to regulate 
global tax compliance, and ultimately evolved into a more 
collaborative engagement with developing countries and other 
nonmember states on transparency and disclosure issues.29 
The momentum created by the OECD harmful tax competition 
project culminated in the introduction of a Model Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (Model TIEA) in 2002.30 In the first decade of 
 
elopment.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). Member countries that have subsequently joined, in 
chronological order through 1998 (i.e. the time of the Harmful Tax Competition Report), are 
Japan, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Korea. List of OECD Member Countries–Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries 
.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). 
 26. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 3, 26–30, 
67–71 (1998), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf. Although some of the 
steps recommended to limit harmful tax competition were internal (e.g., improving rules for the 
taxation of controlled foreign corporations), others directly targeted other countries (e.g., 
recommendation to produce a list of tax havens), many of which were not OECD members. See 
id. at 10, 37–59, 67–71. The United States, which initially supported the harmful tax 
competition project, withdrew its support during a change in administration contending that 
the project “stifle[d]” competition. Ault, supra note 24, at 769–70 (quoting the incoming U.S. 
Secretary of the Treasury). 
 27. See OECD, THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: 2006 UPDATE ON 
PROGRESS IN MEMBER COUNTRIES 2, 5–6 (2006), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/
37446434.pdf. 
 28. Ault, supra note 24, at 770–72 (describing the historical events that led the formal 
project to stall). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd. 
org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/taxinformationexchangeagreementstieas.htm (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2016). For a copy of the Model TIEA, see OECD, AGREEMENT ON EXCHANGE 
OF INFORMATION ON TAX MATTERS (2002) [hereinafter MODEL TIEA], 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/2082215. pdf. During the 1990s, the OECD began to 
study the issue of harmful tax competition. See OECD, supra note 26, at 7–9. Although the 
specific project experienced some backlash, it ultimately led to the OECD’s focus on exchange 
of information and to the related OECD Model TIEA in 2002. See Diane Ring, Article 26: 
Exchange of Information, in GLOBAL TAX TREATY COMMENTARIES, at 1.2.5.2, 3.1 (2016) 
1767 Developing Countries in an Age of Transparency and Disclosure 
 1777 
the twenty-first century, many traditional “tax haven” jurisdictions, as 
well as others, did not have an extensive network of bilateral tax 
treaties. 31  The Model TIEA sought to bridge this gap in treaty 
coverage by furthering tax transparency and disclosure, even in the 
absence of a full treaty.32 The content of the Model TIEA essentially 
tracks that of Article 26, although there are some notable differences. 
Unlike treaties, TIEAs can be multilateral.33 They focus on exchange 
of information on request, “cover specific taxes,” and include greater 
detail than tax treaties regarding the type of information that a state 
must provide to initiate a request under the agreement.34 
c. The global forum on transparency and exchange of information 
for tax purposes. Also during the early 2000s, the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global 
Forum) was established under the leadership of the OECD.35 Initially, 
the Global Forum focused on tax compliance challenges fueled by the 
existence of tax havens and helped create the Model TIEA.36 In 2009, 
the Global Forum was re-envisioned by the OECD as the G20 urged 
more extensive implementation of transparency and exchange of 
information standards.37 By mid-2016, the Global Forum had 137 
 
[hereinafter Ring, Article 26]; Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: 
International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 182–201 (2008). 
 31. See, e.g., Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens and the Transparency Wave of International 
Tax Legalization, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1153, 1158–59 (2016) (noting tax havens have few 
bilateral tax treaties). Bilateral tax treaties would include not only information exchange 
provisions but also those directed at allocation of taxing rights between source and residence. 
 32. See, e.g., AFRICAN TAX ADMINISTRATION FORUM & OECD, A PRACTICAL GUIDE ON 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2–3 (2013), https://www. 
oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/practical_guide_exchange_of_information.pdf. 
 33. MODEL TIEA, supra note 30, at introduction para. 5. 
 34. See Diane Ring, Transparency and Disclosure [hereinafter Ring, Transparency and 
Disclosure], in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX 
BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 1, at 497, 560. 
 35. See Ault, supra note 24, at 771–72; OECD, THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY 
AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: INFORMATION BRIEF 2 (2013) 
[hereinafter OECD, INFORMATION BRIEF], http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/global
_forum_background%20brief.pdf. 
 36. See id. (“The original members of the Global Forum consisted of OECD countries 
and jurisdictions that had agreed to implement the international standard for transparency and 
exchange of information on request for tax purposes.”). 
 37. Id.; see also Ring, Article 26, supra note 30, at 1.2.5.2, 1.2.5.3 (describing the 
evolution of TIEAs and the Global Forum). 
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members (both OECD and non-OECD countries), all participating 
as equals. 38  The new major task of the Global Forum was the 
development and implementation of a peer review process to assess 
whether a country’s legal and regulatory structure was adequate to 
handle the international expectations and standards of tax 
transparency and exchange of information.39 The benchmark in this 
assessment process is the degree to which a jurisdiction is compliant 
with standards consistent with the OECD and UN Models’ Article 26 
and the Model TIEA.40 
d. The 1988 multilateral convention. Finally, the OECD and the 
Council of Europe developed the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters in 1988 (Multilateral 
Convention or Convention) and in 2011 opened it up to all countries 
as participants.41 Over 100 countries have signed on,42 including some 
developing countries (although countries can make individual 
reservations to the basic terms of the Convention).43 The multilateral 
nature of the Convention has allowed it to serve as an efficient 
mechanism for multilateral agreement among jurisdictions on 
administrative issues. As discussed below, this has allowed the 
Multilateral Convention to play an important role in furthering 
automatic exchange of information. 
 
 38. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: About 
the Global Forum, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-
forum/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 39. Peer Review Group, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-
the-global-forum/peerreviewgroup.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
 40. OECD, INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 35; see also Ring, Article 26, supra note 30, 
at 1.2.5.3, 4.5.2 (describing the Global Forum’s peer review process for evaluating a country’s 
compliance with expected standards). 
 41. See Thorbjorn Jagland & Angel Gurria, Preface to OECD & COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX 
MATTERS: AMENDED BY THE 2010 PROTOCOL 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter OECD, MUTUAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/the-multilateral-
convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-matters_9789264115606-en. 
 42. See Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Tax Matters, Status–21 November 2016, OECD.ORG https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-
of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2016). 
 43. See Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 34, at 560. For a more detailed 
comparison of the Multilateral Convention and Article 26 of both the OECD Model and UN 
Model, see Ring, Article 26, supra note 30, at 4.3.1. 
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2. Automatic exchange of information 
The growing focus on information exchange and transparency in 
recent years has led to stronger calls for automatic exchange of 
information, which represents a more substantial and complete 
mechanism for securing data on cross-border transactions than that 
provided under treaties and other agreements. 44  As noted earlier, 
neither the OECD Model nor the UN Model requires automatic 
exchange of information; only exchange on request.45 However, both 
models contemplate the possibility of automatic exchange of 
information in their respective commentaries. 46  Similarly, the 
Multilateral Convention envisions the possibility of automatic 
exchange of information between signatories on terms to which they 
mutually consent.47 
a. The OECD plan for automatic information exchange. By 2013, 
the G20 48  was advocating a shift toward automatic exchange and 
 
 44. See, e.g., G20, G20 DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP DOMESTIC RESOURCE 
MOBILISATION: G20 RESPONSE TO 2014 REPORTS ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 
AND AUOTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF TAX INFORMATION FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 4 
(2014), http://www.g20australia.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/16%20G20%
20response%20to%202014%20reports%20on%20BEPS%20and%20AEOI%20for%20developing
%20economies.pdf (noting, for example, that implementation of automatic exchange “could 
potentially lead to increased tax revenues for developing economies, by detecting tax evasion 
and offshore wealth, and strengthening compliance with domestic tax rules”); OECD, 
STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION: COMMON 
REPORTING STANDARD 5–6 (2014) [hereinafter OECD, COMMON REPORTING STANDARD], 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-financial-accou
nt-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf (noting the interest in automatic exchange at 
the EU level, the OECD, and within both the G8 and the G20). “Automatic exchange of 
information” constitutes the exchange of specified categories of information between treaty 
partners on an automatic basis, i.e. without request from the country to whom the information 
is sent. OECD, COMMON REPORTING STANDARD, supra, at 14 (delineating, in section two of 
the Model Competent Authority Agreement, the terms of automatic information exchange). By 
obviating the need for a formal request, the process for securing the information is streamlined, 
and the recipient jurisdiction can obtain information before knowing that there may be a tax 
evasion or avoidance problem. 
 45. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 46. See UN MODEL (2011), supra note 22, at 456; 2014 OECD MODEL, supra note 22, 
at C(26)-9 to -10. 
 47. OECD, MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE, supra note 41, at 14–15 (articles 6 
& 7). 
 48. Although not exclusively developing countries, the G20 members list does not 
represent the bulk of developed countries. As of 2016, the members include “Argentina, 
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“urge[d] all jurisdictions to move towards exchanging information 
automatically with their treaty partners, as appropriate.”49 To further 
this goal, the G20 issued a mandate to the OECD to prepare standards 
and guidance for automatic information exchange. 50  The OECD 
completed and released the first part of its automatic exchange project 
in February 2014, the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial 
Account Information: Common Reporting Standard.51 Several months 
later, the OECD released the second part of the project: Standard for 
Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax 
Matters. 52  This more extensive report included (1) the Model 
Competent Authority Agreement (Model CAA) that states could sign 
to implement automatic exchange with a treaty partner, (2) the 
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) (providing details on the 
exchange process including definitions, reporting requirements, and 
due diligence expectations), and (3) commentary to offer guidance on 
implementing the Model CAA and the CRS itself.53 
 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the European Union (EU).” G20, About G20, G20.ORG (Nov. 27, 2015, 10:13 AM), 
http://www.g20.org/English/aboutg20/AboutG20/201511/t20151127_1609.html. 
 49. Communiqué, G20, Meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: 
Washington 4 (April 18–19, 2013), http://www.g20.org/English/Documents/Past
Presidency/201512/t20151228_2072.html. 
 50. Id. The OECD itself has characterized the G20 statements as a “mandate”: “The G20 
has mandated the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes to establish a mechanism to monitor and review the implementation of the new global 
standard on automatic exchange of information. The Global Forum’s automatic exchange of 
Information Group is in the process of designing the review process.” OECD, AUTOMATIC 
EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION: BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF 8 
(2016) [hereinafter OECD, BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF], http://www.oecd.org/tax/
exchange-of-tax-information/Automatic-Exchange-Financial-Account-Information-Brief. pdf.  
 51. OECD, COMMON REPORTING STANDARD, supra note 44. The G20 noted its 
approval for the common reporting standard established by the OECD: “We endorse the 
Common Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of tax information on a reciprocal basis 
and will work with all relevant parties, including our financial institutions, to detail our 
implementation plan at our September meeting.” Communiqué, G20, Meeting of G20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors: Sydney 2 (Feb. 22-23, 2014), http:// 
www.g20.org/English/Documents/PastPresidency/201512/t20151225_1835.html. 
 52. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2014) [hereinafter OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC 
EXCHANGE], http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2314131e.pdf? expires=14
78126122&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=B8C67A5E8257C9A2846067B8B7ADF82B. 
 53. Id. at 14–17. 
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To implement the OECD’s automatic exchange plan, interested 
jurisdictions would need to take two steps. First, they would need to 
review their domestic law and make any changes necessary to meet 
their obligations under the automatic exchange standard.54 Areas of 
domestic law likely to need reform include laws requiring financial 
entities to gather and report certain data and laws to ensure the 
appropriate protection and privacy of taxpayer data. 55  Second, 
jurisdictions would need to formally agree to exchange information 
on an automatic basis.56 This step would be required because existing 
agreements (including bilateral tax treaties based on the OECD 
Model or the UN Model, or the Multilateral Convention) lack self-
executing automatic exchange provisions and therefore would require 
an affirmative commitment and articulation of terms. Due to the 
potential burden of trying to negotiate many bilateral competent 
authority agreements for automatic information exchange, the 
Multilateral Convention has played a central role in the planned roll-
out of the OECD automatic exchange package. The OECD has 
recommended that the Model CAA for committing to automatic 
exchange be signed under the framework of the Multilateral 
Convention because the Convention would facilitate multiple 
countries entering into a competent authority agreement (CAA), 
thereby streamlining the process.57 
By October 2014, fifty-one countries had signed a multilateral 
CAA under the Multilateral Convention;58 and by November 2016, 
the number increased to eighty-seven countries.59 Some signatories 
agreed to participate as “early adopters,” each of whom would begin 
exchanging information by September 2017.60 Others committed to 
 
 54. Id. at 10, 16, 72–73. 
 55. Id. at 72–73, 82, 87, 108. 
 56. Id. at 14. 
 57. Id. at 14, 21–27. 
 58. OECD, BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 50, at 3. 
  59. Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information and Intended First Information Exchange Date, OECD.ORG 
(Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/MCAA-Sign
atories.pdf. 
 60. ARGENTINA ET AL., JOINT STATEMENT BY THE EARLY ADOPTERS GROUP 1 (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-early-adopters-statement.pdf; see also OECD, 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 50, at 2 (“[N]early 50 jurisdictions had joined 
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the CAA with a target implementation date of 2018.61 The standards 
to which the countries have agreed address a range of details, 
including who must collect information, the level and nature of due 
diligence required in the collection process, the types of information 
that must be collected, and the types of accounts for which the 
specified information must be collected.62 The CRS also covers the 
technical dimension of the exchange process including the 
preparation, organization, and delivery of information.63 
b. EU directives. Although the OECD plan for automatic exchange 
(the CRS and the Model CAA) represents the broadest and most 
comprehensive effort to initiate a system of automatic exchange of tax 
information, it was not the first. In 2005, the European Union Savings 
Directive took effect, 64  requiring automatic exchange among EU 
members with respect to interest earned by resident individuals. 65 
Eventually, this Directive was effectively replaced by a series of EU 
Directives calling for the automatic exchange among EU member 
states of financial account information (including interest, dividends, 
other income, account balances, and financial asset sales).66 In 2015, 
a subsequent EU Directive called on members to agree to automatic 
exchange of advance cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing 
agreements.67 This Directive was motivated by the public recognition 
that some EU member states may be issuing tax rulings that result in 
low taxes on “artificially high amounts of income in the country 
issuing . . . the advance ruling” and that leave “artificially low amounts 
of income to be taxed in any other countries involved.”68 In January 
2016, the EU Commission introduced an Anti-Tax Avoidance 
 
this group and committed to the early adoption of the standard developed by OECD, including 
a specific and ambitious timetable for doing so.”). 
 61. OECD, AEOI: STATUS OF COMMITMENTS 1 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/
transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf. 
 62. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE, supra note 52, at 11–12. 
 63. Id. at 14, 17, 230–32. 
 64. Council Directive 2003/48, art. 17, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38, 45 (EC). 
 65. See Ring, Article 26, supra 30, at 1.2.5.5. 
 66. See, e.g., Council Directive 2014/107, 2014 O.J. (L 359) 1, 2 (EU). 
 67. See Council Directive 2015/2376, 2015 O.J. (L 332) 1, 2–3 (EU). 
 68. Id. at 1. 
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Package69 comprising multiple measures, including a revised Directive 
proposing country-by-country reporting between member states’ tax 
authorities on important tax-related information of multinationals 
operating within the EU.70 
c. FATCA. The EU push for automatic exchange was motivated 
and shaped in part by the United States’ enactment and 
implementation of its Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) 
regime in 2010. 71  Under FATCA, foreign and domestic financial 
institutions must report specific financial information to the United 
States on U.S. account holders worldwide (or face negative tax 
consequences). 72  The requirements imposed on foreign financial 
institutions were not only burdensome but they also created the 
potential for conflict with foreign financial institutions’ domestic legal 
obligations. 73  As a result, the “United States entered into 
[intergovernmental agreements (“IGAs”)]74 with various jurisdictions 
to offer a streamlined and legal way for financial institutions in those 
jurisdictions to comply with [the automatic reporting obligations 
under the FATCA rules].”75 The FATCA regime and the resulting 
 
 69. European Commission, Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, EC.EUROPA.EU (Nov. 3, 
2016), http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-avoidance-
package__en. 
 70. European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 
2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation, 
at 2–3, COM (2016) 25 final (Jan. 28, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html? 
uri=cellar:89937d6d-c5a8-11e5-a4b5-01aa75ed71a1.0014.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. 
 71. See Ring, Article 26, supra note 30, at 1.2.5.9.2. 
 72. I.R.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012). 
 73. See, e.g., Shamik Trivedi & Eric Kroh, U.S. Issues Joint Statements on FATCA, 67 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 7, 7 (2012) (quoting acting assistant Treasury secretary for tax policy, Emily 
McMahon, when it says that “[an IGA] addresses domestic legal impediments and reduces 
burdens on financial institutions”). 
 74. The United States ultimately produced two model IGAs that it has used as the basis 
for negotiated agreements with other countries, IGA Model 1 and IGA Model 2. FATCA 
Information for Governments, IRS.GOV (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
corporations/fatca-governments. For a list of jurisdictions that have signed IGAs with the 
United States, see Additional FACTA Documents, TREASURY.GOV (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-Archive.aspx. 
 75. Ring, Article 26, supra note 30, at 1.2.5.5. Financial institutions in some jurisdictions 
expressed concern that provision of the taxpayer data under the FATCA rules could subject the 
institution to liability (criminal or civil) in their domestic jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 1.2.5.5 
n.109 (noting that some foreign financial institutions had raised this concern); Chilean Banking 
Association Requests IGA for FATCA Implementation Purposes, 2013 TAX NOTES TODAY 30-17 
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IGAs set the standard for automatic exchange of information between 
nations.76 Moreover, as jurisdictions observed the number of IGAs 
being signed with the United States, they began to explore the 
possibility of acquiring comparable data on their own taxpayers’ 
foreign income and assets from financial institutions.77 
d. Other information exchange mechanisms. Although beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is worth noting the range of other mechanisms 
for transparency, disclosure, and exchange of information that have all 
played a role in crystalizing expectations and framing discussions in 
international taxation, including the Financial Action Task Force,78 
 
(Feb. 13, 2013) (“[A]t present, . . . compliance with these aspects of FATCA [without an IGA] 
would subject Chilean banks and their employees to potential criminal prosecution.”). 
 76. The OECD has characterized its CRS model as one that consciously builds on 
FATCA.  OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION IN 
TAX MATTERS: THE CRS IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK 6 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/c
tp/exchange-of-tax-information/implementation-handbook-standard-for-automatic-exchange
-of-financial-information-in-tax-matters.pdf (“This is a standardised automatic exchange model, 
which builds on the FATCA IGA to maximise efficiency and minimise costs.”). 
 77. For example, the United Kingdom signed its own IGA with Jersey. Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the Government of Jersey (“Government of Jersey”) and her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
Relating to Cooperation in Tax Matters, GOV.JE, http://www.gov.je/Site
CollectionDocuments/Tax%20and%20your%20money/LD%20UKFATCAMOU%202013032
7%20CP.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2016). For other similar agreements signed by the United 
Kingdom, see HM Revenue & Customs, Automatic Exchange of Information Agreements: Other 
UK Agreements, GOV.UK (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/automatic-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-agreements/automatic
-exchange-of-information-agreements-other-uk-agreements. Also, in 2015 Switzerland signed 
an agreement requiring automatic exchange of financial account information with the EU and 
signed a similar agreement with Australia. See State Secretariat for Int’l Fin. Matters, Automatic 
Exchange of Information, SIF.ADMIN.CH (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.sif. 
admin.ch/sif/en/home/themen/internationale-steuerpolitik/automatischer-informationsaus
tausch.html. 
 78. The G7 established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 to address 
problems of money-laundering international drug trade money through banks and related 
financial institutions. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 25 YEARS AND BEYOND 2 (2014), 
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/FATF%2025%20ye
ars.pdf. The FATF issued guidelines for preventing, detecting, and punishing abuses of the 
financial system in a country. Id. at 2, 5–6. As with global tax enforcement, an important part of 
the money laundering response was grounded in transparency. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF 
40 RECOMMENDATIONS 2, 9 (2003), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF 
Standards - 40 Recommendations rc.pdf. 
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the Joint International Tax Shelter Information and Collaboration,79 
the Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement program,80 and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.81 Additionally, a variety 
of regional tax agreements include exchange of information 
provisions, though often in abbreviated form. Examples of such 
agreements include: (1) the 2008 West African Economic Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) Income and Inheritance Tax Convention (Article 
33); 82  (2) the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) Limited Multilateral Agreement on Avoidance of Double 
 
 79. The Joint International Tax Shelter Information and Collaboration (JISTIC), began 
as the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Center in 2004. See Austrailia, Canada, UK 
and US Agree to Establish Joint Task Force, IRS.GOV (May 3, 2004), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Australia,-Canada,-UK-and-US-Agree-to-Establish-Joint-Task-Force. Initial members 
included the tax commissioners of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Id. In the early years, JITSIC focused on financial products involved in abusive tax 
shelters, taking a collaborative approach to identifying products, promoters, and responses. Id.; 
see e.g., Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre Memorandum of Understanding, 
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/jitsic-finalmou.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) 
(purposes of JITSIC include “[s]har[ing] expertise, best practices and experience in tax 
administration to combat abustive tax schemes”). In the decade following its introduction, 
JITSIC expanded its membership and introduced the JITSIC Network to facilitate collaboration 
on issues of cross-border tax avoidance with a wider group of states. Communiqué, OECD, 
Meeting of the Forum on Tax Administration (FTA): Dublin, Ireland (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/fta-2014-communique.pdf. 
 80. The OECD’s Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement Program (TRACE), with 
roots extending back to 2006, seeks to address the reporting and treaty challenges experienced 
by taxpayers, financial institutions, and tax authorities when investments are held through 
collective investment vehicles (CIVs). About the Trace Project, OECD.ORG, 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/aboutthetracegroup.htm (last visited 
Oct.. 25, 2016). The primary challenge is facilitating the availability of treaty benefits to 
taxpayers investing through CIVs. OECD, TRACE IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE FOR THE 
ADOPTION OF THE AUTHORISED INTERMEDIARY SYSTEM: A STANDARDISED SYSTEM FOR 
EFFECTIVE WITHOLDING TAX RELIEF PROCEDURES FOR CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO INCOME 
3 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/TRACE_Implementation_
Package_Website.pdf. The OECD expects that TRACE standards and the automatic exchange 
CRS will be aligned and that the TRACE program will be available only to jurisdictions that 
have signed on to automatic exchange and CRS. OECD, About the Trace Project, supra. 
 81. See supra note 5. 
 82. Règlement n°08/CM/UEMOA du 26 septembre 2008 portant adoption des règles 
visant à éviter la double imposition au sein de l’UEMOA et des règles d’assistance en matière 
fiscal [Regulation No. 08/CM/UEMOA of 26 September 2008 adopting the rules for the 
avoidance of double taxation within the UEMOA and the rules for assistance in taxation], Sept. 
26, 2008, Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2009-19164, http://droit-afrique.com/upload/
doc/uemoa/UEMOA-Convention-fiscale.pdf. 
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Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance (Article 5);83 and (3) 
the Agreement Among the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 
Profits or Gains and Capital Gains and for the Encouragement of 
Regional Trade and Investment (Article 24).84 
3. BEPS and action item 13 
Perhaps the highest profile transparency and disclosure effort in 
recent years has been Action 13 of the OECD’s BEPS Project initiated 
in 2012.85 The project, which resulted in a series of final reports on 
fifteen action items in October 2015, included Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13—2015 
Final Report (“Final Report”).86 Action 13 comprises a three-part 
system for transparency and disclosure by multinational businesses: (1) 
the master file, (2) the local file, and (3) the country-by-country 
report template.87 Each element requires different information and a 
different reporting process. According to the Final Report, the regime 
would apply to multinational businesses with “annual consolidated 
group revenue equal to or exceeding EUR 750 million.”88 
a. The master file. The role of the master file is to provide a “high-
level overview . . . [that would] place the MNE group’s transfer 
 
 83. SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Nov. 13, 2005, Tax Analysts Doc. No. 2005-
23606, http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Various%20Publications,% 20Agreements,MOUs, 
%20%20Conventions.%20Charters/PUBLICATIONS/Taxation%20Agreement/pdf/Final%20
Agreement%20on%20Avoidance%20of%20Double%20Taxation%20%20.pdf. 
 84. Agreement Among the Governments of the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits, or Gains and Capital Gains and for the Encouragement of 
Regional Trade and Investment, July 6, 1994, Tax Analysts Doc. No. 95-30604, 
http://cms2.caricom.org/documents/legaldocuments/9261-agreement_among_the_membe
r_states_of_the_caricom_for_the_avoidance_of_double_taxation_and_the_prevention_of_fiscal
_evasion_False . ..._ 2.pdf. 
 85. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 11 (“The G20 finance ministers called on the 
OECD to develop an action plan to address BEPS issues in a co-ordinated and 
comprehensive manner.”). 
 86. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3. 
 87. Id. at 9. 
 88. Id. at 10. 
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pricing practices in their global economic, legal, financial and tax 
context.”89 The file is intended to effectively offer a blueprint of the 
multinational that addresses five major topics: organizational 
structure, description of businesses, intangibles, intercompany 
financial activities, and tax and financial situation. 90  Although the 
information provided need not be an exhaustive listing of the business 
in detail, it should include itemization of major contracts, intangibles, 
and transactions. 91  Annex I to the Final Report provides details 
regarding the content of the master file, but is only two pages and 
repeats essentially the same information provided in the body of the 
report. In terms of delivery, the Final Report envisions that the master 
file would be “filed directly with the tax administrations in each 
relevant jurisdiction as required by those administrations.”92 
b. The local file. The local file offers a much more detailed picture 
of the multinational’s operations in a specific jurisdiction, with a focus 
on intercompany transactions. 93  Here, the goal is to assist the 
jurisdiction in assessing whether the taxpayer has complied with 
transfer pricing rules.94 Thus, material data should be provided on 
transactions between an affiliate in the local country and related 
enterprises in other jurisdictions (e.g., financial information regarding 
the transactions, “comparability analysis, and the selection and 
application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method”).95 As 
with the master file, the annex to the report addressing the local file is 
two pages and generally restates the content of the report, but with a 
 
 89. Id. at 14–15. 
 90. Id. at 15. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 20. This direct filing has raised some concerns regarding taxpayer protection:  
Dorothy Coleman, vice president of tax and domestic economic policy at the National 
Association of Manufacturers, said during the event’s panel discussion that those new 
requirements are her biggest source of concern. She said she was particularly troubled 
by the master file, which she noted would have to be filed directly with foreign tax 
authorities and would therefore not be protected by Treasury’s safeguards against 
exchanging CbC reports with tax authorities that use the information inappropriately.  
Ryan Finley, Lawmakers Urge Limiting Exchange of CbC Reports, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 751, 
751 (2016). 
 93. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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bit more detail.96 With regard to delivery of the local file, the Final 
Report observes that it should be “filed directly with the tax 
administrations in each relevant jurisdiction as required by 
those administrations.”97 
c. The country-by-country template. The most controversial 
element of the Action 13 transparency and disclosure package has 
been the country-by-country (CbC) reporting, presumably because 
the comparative data across countries provides a detailed and global 
snapshot of the business and because the data could readily be 
translated by tax authorities into a rough cut estimate of an 
appropriate tax obligation to the country, potentially by-passing a time 
consuming assessment of the taxpayer’s specific activities in the 
jurisidiction.98 The Final Report itself recognizes the importance of 
this part of the package by devoting forty-one pages of the appendix 
to material relevant to the CbC reporting requirement.99 Under the 
CbC reporting, multinationals would be required to report the 
following data (the Final Report includes a template100 in the annex): 
(1) revenue, (2) earnings before taxes, (3) cash tax, (4) current year 
tax accruals, (5) stated capital, (6) accumulated earnings, (7) number 
of employees, and (8) tangible assets.101 This information would be 
reported on a country-by-country, not entity, basis.102 The template 
triggered debate regarding the specific items to be reported, to whom 
template reporting would be delivered directly, and to whom access 
 
 96. Id. at 27–28. For example, the annex notes that the local file should include a 
“description of the management structure of the local entity,” the reporting chain, the business 
strategy locally, the “[k]ey competitors,” and “[c]opies of all material intercompany agreements 
concluded by the local entity.” Id. at 27. 
 97. Id. at 20. 
 98. Id. at 16. A variety of concerns have emerged regarding the adoption of CbC 
reporting, including fears that (1) countries will use the generalized CbC information to assert 
an adjustment to the taxpayer’s return without actually examining the taxpayers transactions, (2) 
the data will not be adequately protected, (3) the data will be formally made public, and (4) 
some countries will participate and others will not, potentially leading to a unfair competitive 
advantage. See BEPS-Frequently Asked Questions, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
frequentlyaskedquestions.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 99. See ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 29–70. 
 100. Id. at 29–30. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 29. 
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to the report would be granted and under what circumstances.103 The 
Final Report urges that the CbC report should be used by tax 
authorities to assess high-level transfer pricing risk but “should not be 
used as a substitute for a detailed transfer pricing analysis of individual 
transactions and prices based on a full functional analysis and a full 
comparability analysis.”104  
In contrast with the master file and local file, the CbC report 
would be subject to a more formal implementation regime.105 The 
Final Report explains that implementation of the CbC reporting 
requirement would begin with enactment of legislation in the 
jurisdiction of the ultimate parent entity of the multinational group,106 
which would require the parent to file the CbC report in that 
jurisdiction.107 Then, pursuant to an automatic exchange mechanism, 
the parent jurisdiction would distribute the CbC report to all of the 
 
 103. See, e.g.,  Margaret Burrow, News Analysis: Stakeholders Find Common Ground on 
OECD Draft, 73 TAX NOTES INT’L 975 (2014) (reviewing comments from NGOs, the business 
community, and tax advisors); Mindy Herzfeld, News Analysis: Country-by-Country Reporting: 
Drawing the Battle Lines, 73 TAX NOTES INT’L 847 (2014) (reviewing comments from the BEPS 
Monitoring Group, NGOs, and the business community). 
 104. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. Further emphasizing this point, the 
Final Report continues on to admonish that “[t]he information in the Country-by-Country 
Report on its own does not constitute conclusive evidence that transfer prices are or are not 
appropriate. It should not be used by tax administrations to propose transfer pricing adjustments 
based on a global formulary apportionment of income.” Id. 
 105. In this regard, it is useful to note that the CbC reporting requirement regulations 
finalized by the United States in June of 2016 do not include guidance on either the master file 
or the local file. See T.D. 9773, 2016-29 I.R.B. 56; Lewis J. Greenwald & Lucas Giardelli, 
Examining the Proposed U.S. Country-by-Country Reporting Regs, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 485, 
490 (2016) (noting that the proposed regulations do not include a master file requirement but 
that it is anticipated that if the entity prepares one for another jurisdiction, it would likely be 
requested in a U.S. audit). 
 106. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 39. 
 107. In the event that the jurisdiction of the multinational parent did not enact such 
legislation, or failed to enforce it, the Final Report anticipates shifting the burden to another 
entity down the chain. Id. at 23 (“In case a jurisdiction fails to provide information to a 
jurisdiction fulfilling the conditions listed . . . because (a) it has not required Country-by-
Country Reporting from the ultimate parent entity of such MNE groups, (b) no competent 
authority agreement has been agreed in a timely manner under the current international 
agreements of the jurisdiction for the exchange of [a report] or (c) it has been established that 
there is a failure to exchange the information in practice with a jurisdiction after agreeing with 
that jurisdiction to do so, a secondary mechanism would be accepted as appropriate, through 
local filing or through filing [of a report] by a designated member of the MNE group . . . .”). 
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jurisdictions in which the multinational operates. 108  Ideally, this 
mechanism would be a CAA included under the Multilateral 
Convention.109 That is, parties to the Multilateral Convention could 
sign the CAA under the Convention (a model of which is included in 
the annex to the Final Report) and achieve widespread automatic 
exchange in a more streamlined manner. Per this CAA, each signatory 
would exchange any CbC reports it received from multinationals 
headquartered in its jurisdiction with other signatories satisfying the 
terms of the CAA (including confidentiality). Review of this entire 
process is scheduled for 2020.110 
The three-part reporting package of Action 13 triggered 
objections from the business community on a number of grounds, 
including administrative burden, inappropriate use of the information 
in tax enforcement, and failure to protect taxpayer privacy. 111  The 
OECD acknowledged these concerns directly in the Final Report and 
observed that Action 13 sought to strike a balance between essential 
enforcement information and compliance burdens. 112  The Final 
Report also vigorously reaffirmed the proper and exclusive function of 
the CbC reports in a country’s tax enforcement process. 113 
Furthermore, the exchange of the CbC reports would be 
accomplished under the framework of a tax agreement (whether the 
Multilateral Convention or a bilateral tax treaty) that included 
 
 108. Id. at 23. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 10; Country-by-Country Reporting and Global Master Files: BEPS 
Action 13, Global Tax Update, JONESDAY.COM (Sept. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/
country-by-country-reporting-and-global-master-files-oecd-beps-action-13-iglobal-tax-update
i-09-16-2015/ (noting multinationals’ concerns, including the potential use of reporting 
standards for unitary taxation, inapproiate use of information in audit, increase in transfer pricing 
and permanent establishment disputes, and the possible trend toward public disclosure of the 
data); PWC, TAX INSIGHTS FROM TRANSFER PRICING: IRS ISSUES PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
ON COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING 5–6 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax
/newsletters/pricing-knowledge-network/assets/pwc-irs-releases-proposed-cbcr-regulations
.pdf (noting the significant compliance burden on businesses and the lack of clarity in various 
aspects of the regulations, including the permitted sources of data for the information to be 
provided in the CbC report). 
 112. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 10. 
 113. Id. at 16. 
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standards on protection of taxpayer privacy.114 These issues raised by 
multinationals (burden, information abuse, and privacy) resurface 
later in Part III as the Article assesses the developing country 
perspective on the new trends in transparency and disclosure. 
Before turning to a discussion of developing countries and 
international tax policy, it is worth observing who the primary movers 
have been in the recent expansion of transparency and disclosure 
initiatives: the OECD, the EU, the G20, and the United States.115 As 
predominantly higher tax jurisdictions, these countries have been 
particularly concerned about loss of tax base and have viewed 
information as an important tool in stemming the loss of tax 
revenue. 116  However, the story of the transparency and disclosure 
trend has also been described (in the context of automatic exchange) 
as one focused on “establish[ing] a platform for regular flow of 
information mainly between tax havens and some developed 
countries . . . [which,] by and large, ignores the developing countries’ 
participation in the new regime.”117 As will be outlined in more detail 
in the next part, efforts have been made over time to incorporate 
developing countries and their perspectives into the drafting and 
implementation process. Nonetheless, the leading advocates of recent 
transparency and disclosure projects have largely remained more 
developed and economically powerful countries. 
B. Developing Countries and International Tax 
This Section surveys the primary concerns faced by developing 
countries in confronting the emerging transparency, disclosure, and 
information exchange projects in international tax. First, however, a 
few words of analytical caution are necessary. 
 
 114. Additionally, the model CAA that jurisdictions could sign to bring CbC report 
exchange under the auspices of the Multilateral Convention explicitly includes a section on 
“Confidentiality, Data Safeguards and Appropriate Use.” Id. at 49. 
 115. See Vokhid Urinov, Developing Country Perspectives on Automatic Exchange of Tax 
Information, 1 LAW, SOC. JUST. & GLOB. DEV. J. 1, 3–4, 9 (2015), https://www2. 
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2015-1/lgd_2015_1_urinov_pdf.pdf. 
 116. Recall the United States implemented the FATCA regime to gather data on U.S. 
taxpayer foreign accounts. See supra Section I.A.2.c. Additionally, the  EU actively pursued 
automatic exchange through EU-wide savings directives. See supra Section I.A.2.b. 
 117. Vokhid, supra note 115, at 2. 
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The term developing country has no single agreed definition. The 
United Nations (UN), while recognizing the absence of an agreed 
definition,118 groups countries into three broad categories—developed 
economies, economies in transition, and developing economies—in its 
World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) analysis.119 Similarly, 
the OECD acknowledges the absence of a single definition, but also 
recognizes some commonly accepted groupings of countries. 120 
Despite the range of approaches to country classification, the purposes 
to which such classifications are put, and the underlying normative 
implications of classification schemes, a number of factors seem 
generally relevant in assessing a country’s status, including gross 
 
 118. See UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, INDICATORS OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: GUIDELINES AND METHODOLOGIES–METHODOLOGY SHEETS 
336 (3d ed. 2007), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/dsd/dsd_aofw_ind/
ind_csdindi.shtml (“There is no commonly agreed definition of developing countries.”). The 
UN identifies a subgroup, “least developed countries,” for particular attention from the 
international community: “Since 1971, the United Nations has recognized ‘least developed 
countries’ (LDCs) as a category of States that are deemed highly disadvantaged in their 
development process, for structural, historical and also geographical reasons. LDCs face more 
than other countries the risk of deeper poverty and remaining in a situation of 
underdevelopment. More than 75 per cent [sic] of the LDCs’ population still live in poverty. 
These countries are also characterized by their vulnerability to external economic shocks, natural 
and man-made disasters and communicable diseases. As such, the LDCs are in need of the 
highest degree of attention from the international community.” United Nations Conf. on Trade 
& Dev., Least Developed Countries (LDCs), UNCTAD.ORG, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/
ALDC/Least%20Developed%20Countries/LDCs.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
 119. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 143 (2014), ht
tp://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/wesp2014.pdf (“WESP 
classifies all countries of the world into one of three broad categories: developed economies, 
economies in transition and developing economies.”); see also United Nations Statistics Div., 
Composition of Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-Regions, and 
Selected Economic and Other Groupings, UNSTATS.UN.ORG (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm (“There is no established 
convention for the designation of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or areas in the United 
Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern 
America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered ‘developed’ regions 
or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as 
a developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former 
Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (code 172) in Europe are not included under either 
developed or developing regions.”). 
 120. OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms: Developed, Developing Countries, OECD.ORG 
(Jan. 4, 2006), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6326 (citing the UN 
observation regarding the terms “‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries”). 
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national income, longevity, and education.121 Put another way, many 
of the challenges faced by developing countries (including those 
relevant in international tax policy) are a function of their limitations 
or struggles in these areas. 
The generic difficulty of defining the term developing countries is 
further muddied by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (known as the “BRICS”122) and, particularly, the active role 
India and China have played in challenging the existing international 
tax system. In recent years, the increasing global economic 
engagement of these countries has led them to dispute the 
assumptions and framework of the international tax system that has 
operated throughout the 20th century.123 This advocacy creates some 
confusion and ambiguity in trying to assess international tax policy 
from a developing country perspective: the BRICS do not share a 
uniform view on ideal international tax policy, and their primary goals 
and concerns may not reflect the dominant needs of most developing 
countries, even if they are challenging the preferred practices of 
 
 121. Lynge Nielsen, Classifications of Countries Based on their Levels of Development: How 
it is Done and How it Could be Done 5–6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/31, 
2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1131.pdf. 
 122. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 123. See, e.g., Pasquale Pistone & Yariv Brauner, Introduction to BRICS AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION, supra note 9, at  3, 3–6 (“Emerging 
Economies—most vocally, China and India—are challenging this dominance, effectively 
asserting some of their newly found power in various forums.”). One notable example of a 
decision to acknowledge the alternative perspectives held by the BRICS on major topics in 
international tax was the inclusion of a separate chapter in the United Nations Practical Manual 
on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries on the distinctive approaches of Brazil, China, 
India, and South Africa. UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS 
PRACTICAL MANUAL ON TRANSFER PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 357–415 (2013), 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/documents/UN_Manual_TransferPricing.pdf. The preface to 
this manual observes that the approaches of these four countries do not represent the consensus 
of the UN:  
While consensus has been sought as far as possible, it was considered most in accord 
with a  practical manual to include some elements where consensus could not be 
reached, and it follows that specific views expressed in this Manual should not be 
ascribed to any particular persons involved in its drafting. Chapter 10 is different from 
other chapters in its conception, however. It represents an outline of particular 
country administrative practices as described in some detail by representatives from 
those countries, and it was not considered feasible or appropriate to seek a consensus 
on how such country practices were described. Chapter 10 should be read with that 
difference in mind.  
Id. at viii. 
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developed countries.124 Thus, although the BRICS may constitute an 
identifiable voice speaking out against some established international 
tax practices, in many cases they are not concerned with the same 
issues as core developing countries 125  (which themselves do not 
constitute a homogeneous group). 
The point of these caveats is neither to disregard views expressed 
by the BRICS nor to undermine the broader project of identifying 
issues of concern to developing countries. Rather, it is to indicate the 
degree of complexity involved in trying to identify and articulate the 
major concerns of developing countries in international tax. 
1. The primary substantive international tax concerns of 
developing countries 
Developing countries, as well as the BRICS in some cases, have 
identified a range of concerns with the international tax system, both 
in substantive law and tax administration. Important substantive law 
topics include source country taxation, the scope of permanent 
establishment taxation, and transfer pricing (arm’s length standard v. 
formulary apportionment).126 Although these issues attract attention 
in all jurisdictions, they can be particularly significant in developing 
countries for several reasons. First, source jurisdiction, or the ability to 
tax multinationals and others doing business in a given jurisdiction, 
matters greatly to those countries which have a less substantial base of 
tax residents (corporate or individual) earning significant global 
 
 124. See Diane Ring, Institutional Aspects (noting the examples of variation among BRICS 
countries interests, goals and policies, and the potential for divergence from each other but also 
from the bulk of developing countries), in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
TAX COORDINATION, supra note 9, at 469, 469–93; see also Vann, supra note 9, at 386–87 
(noting “that by the early 2030s the [expected] output of China and India alone will exceed that 
of the advanced economies”). 
 125. See Ring, supra note 124, at 469–93 (considering the degree to which the BRICS 
may find their connection to developing countries lessen as they are increasingly interested in 
residence-based taxation and other design issues more commonly associated with 
developed economies). 
 126. See, e.g., Ault & Arnold, supra note 9, at 6–8 (identifying major developing country 
concerns in international taxation); Vann, supra note 124, at 387–92 (examining India’s and 
China’s concerns regarding international taxation); F. Alfredo Garcia Prats, Impact of the Position 
of the BRICS on the UN Model Convention, in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION, supra note 9, at 393, 410–17. 
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income. 127  Second, strong permanent establishment rules, which 
govern taxation of a nonresident doing business in the jurisdiction, 
offer a way to secure source-based taxation. 128  Recognizing the 
centrality of the permament establishment issues for developing 
countries, the UN has addressed the topic of services permanent 
establishments and of the authority to tax in the absence of a 
permanent establishment or physical presence.129 
Finally, tax planning by multinationals via transfer pricing can be 
difficult for developing countries to combat. 130  Under the arm’s 
length method, a tax authority seeking to assert a deficiency must 
evaluate substantial quantities of factual and economic data, examine 
the comparables and economic analyses prepared by the taxpayer, and 
apply one or more complicated pricing methods to the taxpayer’s 
transactions. Jurisdictions with limited administrative resources find 
this process especially daunting.  
 
 127. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 9, at 6. 
 128. Id. at 16–19; Adolpho Martín Jimenéz, Preventing Avoidance of Permanent 
Establishment Status, in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING 
THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 1, at 325, 325–27. 
 129. For example, Art. 5(3)(b) of the UN Model provides for a services permanent 
establishment under some circumstances:  
The furnishing of services, including consultancy services, by an enterprise through 
employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only if 
activities of that nature continue (for the same or a connected project) within a 
Contracting State for a period or periods aggregating more than 183 days in any 12-
month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned.  
UN MODEL (2011), supra note 22, at 10. The decision to include this language in the UN 
Model is a one of the notable departures it has made from the OECD Model that it tracks. Id. 
at 96–97. Additionally, the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters has explored in detail the possibility of adding a new article to the UN Model that would 
provide for source country taxation of “technical services,” would be expected to increase the 
ability of the source country to tax certain activities occurring inside the jurisdiction by lowering 
the threshold for taxation. See U.N. Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, 
Note from the Coordinator of the Subcommittee on Tax Treatment of Services: Draft Article 
and Commentary on Technical Services 9–10, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2014/CRP.8 (Sept. 30, 
2014), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/10STM_CRP8_Tech
nicalServices1.pdf; see also Jimenéz, supra note 128, at 374–75 (referencing the work of the 
United Nations Committee of Experts on the possible inclusion of a technical services article in 
the UN Model). 
 130. See, e.g., Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 34, at 530–31 (noting the 
challenges faced by developing countries with more limited audit resources). 
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2. Administrative constraints faced by developing countries 
More broadly, the inability of developing countries to effectively 
respond to multinationals’ tax planning efforts as an administrative 
matter may prove distinctly harmful. A 2015 study by the 
International Monetary Fund concluded that lower-income 
developing countries rely more substantially on the corporate tax 
portion of their tax base, thus, base erosion and profit shifting among 
multinational businesses generates distinct burdens for such 
countries. 131  Quantifying this harm, the OECD estimated that 
“developing countries lose three times more to tax havens than they 
receive in international aid.”132 
Developing countries, recognizing some of their shared concerns, 
have joined together to assess and pursue new strategies. For example, 
in July 2015, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) conducted a 
meeting with the tax commissioners from its neighboring jurisdictions 
to discuss prominent tax and customs issues, citing the OECD’s 
conclusion (discussed above) regarding the disparity between lost tax 
revenue and developing country aid.133 Jurisdictions participating in 
the SARS meeting (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland, and Zambia) drafted a joint resolution. 134  Among the 
topics addressed was the suitability of the current BEPS CbC design 
 
 131. Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud De Mooij & Michael Keen, Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and 
Developing Countries 4–5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/118, 2015), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15118.pdf. Relatedly, a Eurodad report 
concluded that illicit financial flows out of developing countries totaled “$6 billion in 2011,” 
equivalent to “4.3% of their GDP,” and that developing countries “lost a higher proportion of 
their GDP than middle-income developing countries.” JESSE GRIFFITHS, FINANCING FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: KEY CHALLENGES FOR POLICY MAKERS 7 (2015), 
http://eurodad.org/files/pdf/1546457-financing-for-development-key-challenges-for-policy-
makers.pdf. 
 132. Tax Them and They Will Grow, ECONOMIST, July 11–17, 2015, at 67 (citing “Angel 
Gurría, the secretary-general of the OECD”). 
 133. South African Revenue Service, SARS Convenes Cross-Border Forum on Illicit 
Financial Flows, SARS.GOV (July 17, 2015), http://www.sars.gov.za/Media/MediaReleases/
Pages/17-July-2015—-SARS-convenes-cross-border-forum-on-illicit-financial-flows.aspx. 
 134. JOINT STATEMENT OF THE COMMISSIONERS GENERAL AND HEADS OF 
DELEGATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, 
SWAZILAND AND ZAMBIA 1 (2015) [hereinafter JOINT STATEMENT],  http://www.sars. 
gov.za/AllDocs/Documents/MediaReleases/Joint%20statement%20of%20the%20Comissione
rs%20General%20and%20heads%20of%20delegation%20-%20%20Illicit%20Financial%20Flows
%20meeting%20-%2016%20July%202015.pdf. 
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for developing countries. The joint resolution concluded, “[T]he 
[Euro] threshold for CbC reporting may be too high for multinational 
enterprises headquartered in the sub-region. We agree to explore the 
possibility of a lower threshold for these enterprises in our sub-
region.”135 In essence, the complaint was that the high CbC threshold 
established by the OECD would prevent these developing countries 
from taking advantage of the informational benefits wrought by BEPS 
CbC reporting because multinationals headquartered in the region 
would be unlikely to trigger this Euro reporting threshold. 
Relatedly, a UN Tax Committee questionnaire136 on base erosion 
and profit shifting broadly, and on the BEPS Project specifically, 
revealed that developing country respondents generally agreed that 
among the fifteen BEPS action items, the eight items most related to 
strengthening source country taxation or improving transparency 
between tax authorities and multinationals were the most 
important.137 A number of respondents indicated, however, that the 
remaining seven BEPS action items were also important.138 Notably, 
however, respondents also enumerated the following international tax 
problems that were not included in the BEPS Project yet did warrant 
attention, even if they were most relevant to developing countries: (1) 
domestic anti-avoidance rules, (2) taxation of capital gains (under 
both domestic law and treaties), (3) rebalancing source and residence 
taxation (particularly under treaties), (4) the taxation of branch 
profits, (5) the cash economy, and (6) the use of tax incentives.139 
From an administrative and implementation perspective, the 
constraints that plague developing countries in other arenas also 
impact their ability to engage in effective cross-border taxation.140 And 
 
 135. Id. at 1–2. 
 136. United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax-committee/tc-beps.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) 
(providing information on the base erosion and profit shifting questionnaire and the responses 
to that questionnaire). Thirteen countries responded publicly to the questionnaire, as did 
“Christian Aid and Action Aid” and “Economic Justice Network and Oxfam South Africa.” Id. 
Additional countries responded but requested confidentiality. Carmel Peters, Developing 
Countries’ Reactions to the G20/OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, BULL. 
FOR INT’L TAX’N, June/July 2015, at 375. 
 137. Peters, supra note 136, at 379. 
 138. Id. at 379–81. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 381. 
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these same constraints may impact their ability to take advantage of or 
to comply with the requirements of the emerging transparency and 
disclosure initiatives. Often grouped under the broad heading of a 
need for “capacity building,” 141  these difficulties can include 
inadequately trained staff, inability to retain trained staff who can shift 
to the private sector, limited technology, unclear division of 
responsibility for tax issues (e.g., tax holidays granted by other 
departments of government), and limited budgets. 142  Although 
automation has been helpful in increasing effective tax collection in 
some contexts,143 certain tasks, such as the taxation of multinationals, 
will likely continue to require trained personnel.  
One very significant issue that bridges substantive law and 
administration is information, or the lack thereof. Developing 
countries note the lack of information as an impediment to successful 
tax enforcement.144 In part, the lack of information may be a function 
of limited exchange of information agreements, limited or untimely 
 
 141. The question of precisely what constitutes “capacity” and how to successfully improve 
it is itself the subject of study. See, e.g., Anthony Land, Developing Capacity for Tax 
Administration: The Rwandan Revenue Authority (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Policy Mgmt., Discussion 
Paper No. 57D, 2004), http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/DP-57D-
Developing-Capacity-Tax-Administration-Rwanda-Revenue-Authority.pdf. 
 142. INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTERNAL 
SUPPORT IN BUILDING TAX CAPACITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PREPARED FOR 
SUBMISSION TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS 10, 12, 19–22, 30, 38 (2016), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/858011469113510187/Enhancing-the-Effectiveness-of-
External-Support-in-Building-Tax-Capacity.pdf (noting issues with training staff, retaining 
specialists, technology integration, budget, transparency, and tax expenditures). Additional 
challenges that developing countries face in trying to improve their tax systems are issues of 
corruption and violence. See, e.g., JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 134, at 2 (“We resolve to work 
together to root out all forms of corruption.”); Tax Them and They Will Grow, supra note 132, 
at 67 (“By one reckoning a fifth of tax collectors in the capital [of Somalia], Mogadishu, were 
killed in 2012–14. Armed guards now accompany the remainder on their rounds.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Ben Gasore, Rwanda: Local Government Collection Goes Online, NEW TIMES 
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201508270921.html (describing changes in 
Rwanda’s revenue collection and the move towards automation to improve “efficiency and 
effectiveness”); Tax Them and They Will Grow, supra note 132, at 67 (reporting that Rwanda 
increased tax revenue collection six and one-half times after it introduced automation to the 
collection process). 
 144. Peters, supra note 136, at 379 (developing country respondants listed BEPS Action 
13, which provides information valuable in assessing transfer pricing, as among the most 
important elements of the BEPS Project). 
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exchange, or an inability to adequately process information.145 To the 
extent foreign multinationals have historically posed a threat to 
effective tax administration due to limited transparency and disclosure, 
that risk can be greater for developing countries, which often have 
substantially more inbound investment than outbound investment 
(and thus more foreign than domestic multinationals) but less access 
to information about such inbound investment or ability to process 
it. 146  In this way, developing countries depend more heavily on 
information exchange mechanisms to secure relevant tax data 
regarding the foreign multinationals operating in their jurisdictions. 
3. Treaties-related constraints on developing countries 
A major debate in contemporary international tax policy rages 
over the value of income tax treaties to developing countries. 147 
Though perhaps not immediately obvious, there is an important 
connection between this debate and recent transparency and 
disclosure trends. Because the value of a tax treaty to developing 
countries is debatable, many developing countries may have neither 
traditional bilateral treaties nor an extensive TIEA network. To the 
extent that these treaty relationships are prerequisites for participation 
in some transparency and disclosure regimes, developing countries 
may be constrained from participating fully.148 At a deeper level, the 
reasons why the value of treaties for developing countries is being 
debated in the first place serve as useful reminders that the needs and 
circumstances of countries vary greatly. Even a regime touted as a 
universally desirable step toward positive cooperation with other 
countries (and initially designed to be equitable and balanced) may 
prove otherwise in the context of a developing country. 
 
 145. See id. at 378–79; Ring, Transparency and Disclosure, supra note 34, at 501; see also 
Urinov, supra note 115, at 9–12 (detailing the ways in which countries might avoid true 
participation and exchange with some countries). 
 146. See Ring, supra note 34, at 501. 
 147. As noted in the introduction, there has been debate regarding whether tax treaties are 
good for developing countries, whether and which international organizations adequately 
represent and consider their needs, and whether the dominant concerns of current global tax 
discussions reflect their primary concerns. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Urinov, supra note 115, at 8–12 (noting, for example, that not all developed 
countries have signed the Multilateral Convention and therefore automatic exchange with them 
would need to take place via a bilateral mechanism). 
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Although many developing countries have entered into tax 
treaties,149 a number of scholars strongly question the value of a tax 
treaty (at least treaties negotiated under the OECD Model or even the 
UN Model) for developing countries.150 Bilateral tax treaties modeled 
on the OECD Model or the UN Model prioritize residence over 
source taxation by having the source jurisdiction typically reduce or 
eliminate withholding tax on certain income earned by 
nonresidents. 151  If the two signatories have relatively comparable 
investment flows, then favoring residence-based taxation should have 
little net impact on taxable income in the jurisdictions.152 However, if 
the two signatories do not have comparable flows, as would be 
expected in the case of an income tax treaty between a developed 
country and a developing country, the result is not revenue neutral. 
By agreeing to reduce or eliminate source-based withholding, the 
signatory with more capital inflows from non-resident taxpayers—i.e. 
the developing country—may be effectively surrendering its ability to 
collect tax on income otherwise deemed earned and sourced in its 
jurisdiction. Consequently, a larger portion of available tax revenue 
would end up in the hands of the developed country. 
Despite the potential loss in tax revenue due to the preference for 
residence taxation, treaties have often been characterized as an 
essential tool for encouraging multinationals to invest in developing 
countries.153 The tradeoff for surrendering significant source country 
 
 149. For a listing of tax treaties by jurisdiction, see Tax Research Platform, IBDF, 
http://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Tax-Portal/About-Tax-Research-Platform (last visited Sept. 
22, 2016). 
 150. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 151. See 2014 OECD MODEL, supra note 22, at I-5 to I-6; UN MODEL (2011), supra 
note 22, at ix. 
 152. See Vann, supra note 9, at 387–92 (noting the importance of balanced income and 
investment flows in justifying more residence-based tax treaty provisions). 
 153. See, e.g., Ariane Pickering, Why Negotiate Tax Treaties?, in PAPERS ON SELECTED 
TOPICS IN NEGOTIATION OF TAX TREATIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 3–4 (2014), 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Papers_TTN.pdf (describing 
but not necessarily endorsing the asserted advantages of such treaties, including “[r]emoving or 
reducing double taxation on the inbound investment or transfers,” “[r]educing excessive source 
taxation,” “[p]roviding certainty and/or simplicity with respect to taxation of the inbound 
investment or transfers,” “[d]eveloping a closer relationship between tax authorities and business 
(for instance, through the mutual agreement procedure),” “[m]aintaining benefits of tax 
concessions and tax holidays provided with respect to inbound investment or transfers,” 
“[s]ending a message of willingness to adopt international tax norms,” “[f]ostering diplomatic 
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taxing rights is the expected increase in inbound investment as the 
developing country commits to some shared rules and practices 
regarding cross-border taxation and dispute resolution, and the 
accompanying non-tax benefits. 154  Ultimately, the question of the 
effects of income tax treaties on inbound investment is an empirical 
one. The issue has been the subject of debate and study, without clear 
resolution regarding the size and value of any increased inbound 
investment, particularly as compared to any surrendered source 
country tax revenue.155 As a result, the justification for treaties as the 
tool for attracting meaningful, new inbound investment 
remains uncertain.156 
 
or other relations with the other country,” and “[s]trengthening regional diplomatic, trade and 
economic ties”); see also Eric Neumayer, Do Double Tax Treaties Increase Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries?, 43 J. DEV. STUD. 1501 (2007) (empirical study of whether 
the expected trade-off between lost tax revenue and increased investment is real). 
 154. See, e.g., Tsilly Dagan, BRICS: Theoretical Framework and Potential of Cooperation 
(challenging the reality of investment benefits for developing countries from income tax treaties), 
in BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION, supra note 9, at 
15, 18. 
 155. See, e.g., Fabian Barthel et al., The Relationship Between Double Taxation Treaties and 
Foreign Direct Investment, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 3 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010); Martha O’Brien & Kim Brooks, Direct 
Taxation, Tax Treaties and IIAs: Mixed Objectives, Mixed Results, in IMPROVING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 303 (Armand de Mestral & Céline Lévesque eds., 
2013); THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAX TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs 
eds., 2009); K.V. Bhanu Murthy & Niti Bhasin, The Impact of Bilateral Tax Treaties on FDI 
Inflows: The Case of India (Mar. 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2234966; Neumayer, supra note 153; Sunghoon Hong, Tax Treaties 
and Foreign Direct Investment (Apr. 25, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2769772; see also Dagan, supra note 154, at 18 n.4 (explaining that 
“J.P. Daniels, P.O’Brien & M.B. von der Ruhr, Bilateral Tax Treaties and US Foreign Direct 
Investment Financing Modes, Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. (2014),” “show[s] increased foreign direct 
investment activity associated with treaties, but not[es] that the increase may—in many cases—
be explained by endogenous factors such as the shift of certain countries to market economies; 
such countries needed visible signals that their economies have changed—thus the surge in 
treaties that preceded the investment”). 
 156. See supra note 153. In a paper studying the spillover from international corporate tax 
policy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that “[t]he empirical evidence on the 
investment effects of treaties is mixed,” and that the the potential revenue loss, “especially to 
developing countries . . . has caused increasing concern.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS 
IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 26 (2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/
pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf. Utlimately, the IMF advocated caution for any capital importing 
country contemplating a bilateral tax treaty and suggested that a combination of domestic law 
and a tax information exchange agreement may be a more appropriate alternative. Id. at 27. 
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The distributional and jurisdictional concerns driving objections 
to bilateral double tax treaties do not apply directly to agreements to 
exchange information, which impose no constraints on the taxing 
decisions of the signatories. Thus, a developing country could 
plausibly conclude that current double tax treaties were undesirable, 
and yet pursue commitments to exchange information and promote 
transparency and disclosure. However, as noted above, many 
developing countries do not have universal networks of TIEAs.157 
Moreover, the same broad concerns that plague tax treaties may be 
relevant to TIEAs as well. It is possible that a regime—in the case of 
TIEAs, an information-exchange regime—that is presumed to be in 
all countries’ best interests may contain built-in assumptions and may 
inadvertently produce an outcome that fails to reflect the best interests 
of a wide swath of countries. This critique is echoed in the concerns, 
outlined below, regarding the emerging automatic exchange and 
BEPS reporting mechanisms. 
4. International organizations and tax policy 
International organizations, particularly the OECD and the UN, 
play an active role in shaping international tax policy. Various 
commentators and observers of international tax policy debates have 
argued that international organizations, and in particular the OECD, 
favor wealthier, developed economies in designing and supporting 
various international tax policies and disregard the distinctive needs 
and policy preferences of developing countries, whether intentionally 
or not. 158  The claim is not new, but the increased emphasis on 
international tax cooperation in the past fifteen to twenty years has 
generated renewed interest. 159  Certainly the UN’s decision to 
introduce its own model tax treaty, based on, but distinct from the 
OECD Model work, reflected its view that there should be a model 
that more accurately reflected the needs of developing countries. The 
 
 157. See supra note 148. 
 158. See supra note 8. 
 159. See, e.g., Léonce Ndikumana, International Tax Cooperation and Implications of 
Globalization 11 (United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Background Paper No. 24, 
2014), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp
2014_24.pdf (“The increased capital mobility has motivated debates on the need for global and 
regional cooperation on corporate income and capital taxation policies.”). 
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title of the UN Model¸ United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries,160 highlights 
the focus on developing countries. Moreover, the Introduction to the 
UN Model offers specific examples of likely divergence between 
developing countries and developed countries on foundational 
treaty issues: 
[The UN Model] generally favours retention of greater so called 
“source country” taxing rights under a tax treaty—the taxation 
rights of the host country of investment—as compared to those of 
the “residence country” of the investor. This has long been regarded 
as an issue of special significance to developing countries, although 
it is a position that some developed countries also seek in their 
bilateral treaties.161 
Yet, the story of how policy choices were made in the model treaty 
context is complex and not simply one of disparate power. Even those 
who have questioned both the value of treaties for developing 
countries and the current emphasis on cooperation in taxation 
nonetheless note that the disconnect between the OECD Model and 
that which might be favored by developing countries may be in part a 
reflection of the OECD’s historical focus, rather than purely a product 
of disparate power. 162  The OECD Model evolved for use among 
OECD members, which were largely developed countries. Thus, the 
distributive impact of the residence-country bias was not as significant 
as it is today, now that the same model is used as the basis for 
negotiations between developing and developed economies. It is not 
surprising that a series of trade-offs and design choices reached by a 
cohort of relatively more comparable nations might be less suited to 
the needs of a later-arriving cohort—the developing countries—to the 
treaty negotiating table. 
More recently, a number of international organizations whose 
roles and memberships differ from that of the OECD and the UN 
have begun to focus on international tax policy and developing 
countries. In that context, they have frequently critiqued the more 
dominant policy player, the OECD, for being influenced by developed 
 
 160. UN MODEL (2011), supra note 22. 
 161. Id. at vi. 
 162. Dagan, supra note 154, at 25. 
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countries and multinational corporations, 163  even though some 
positions advocated by the OECD have elicited strong objections 
from the business community.164 Some groups have urged increased 
engagement of developing countries in the new work on international 
tax encapsulated in the BEPS Project.165 In that regard, a policy brief 
produced by thirty-four international organizations described the 
participation in the BEPS Project by Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, 
and India as “a positive step,” but rejected the idea that their 
involvement was sufficient because “[i]t cannot be assumed . . . that 
 
 163. See, e.g., New Reports on OECD and Developing Countries: Progress, But Far to Go, 
supra note 8 (“The lingering worry, of course, is always that the OECD is a club of rich countries 
and is still merely offering a veneer of representation while getting on with the business of 
looking after its core member states’ interests.”); Press Release, Christian Aid, supra note 8 
(quoting Christian Aid’s Principal Economic Justice Adviser, Toby Quantrill, when it states that 
“[t]he results of the OECD’s project so far suggest that rich countries and multinationals may 
have had more influence over it than many poor countries”). 
 164. For example, the country-by-country reporting recommendations in the BEPS 
Project have generated significant reaction from the business community. See, e.g., Margaret 
Burow, CbC Could Be a Nightmare for Corporate Tax Departments, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 674, 
674 (2015) (quoting Intel Corp.’s vice president of finance and director of global tax and trade, 
Ronald D. Dickel, when it says that “[CbC reporting] is ‘going to be a nightmare, a real game-
changer’ for corporate tax departments”); Herzfeld, supra note 103, at 847–52 (noting the 
objections to the proposed CbC reporting from the business community, including concerns 
about compliance burden, confidentiality, and impact on the arm’s length standard). 
 165. For example, a 2013 policy brief produced by thirty-four international organizations 
(including Oxfam, ActionAid International, Christian Aid (UK), and the Tax Justice Network), 
applauded the work of the OECD and the G20 in targeting international tax problems, but 
judged the role of developing countries in the process to be inadequate: 
The OECD’s BEPS Action Plan is a welcome and long overdue step forward . . . 
[and] provides a unique opportunity to foster fundamental changes . . . . [W]e call 
upon the G20 and the OECD to . . . [t]ake effective steps to ensure that developing 
countries can participate in the BEPS process on an equal footing, and assist them in 
implementing measures to stem their losses from international tax avoidance that 
deprives governments of badly needed tax revenue. 
FIXING THE CRACKS IN TAX: A PLAN OF ACTION 2 (2013), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/
www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/fix-the-cracks-in-tax_0.pdf. The G20, which 
encouraged the BEPS Project, has also recognized that the needs and circumstances of 
developing countries can be different: 
We ask the OECD to continue to draw on engagement with developing economies 
to ensure that the outcomes of the BEPS Action Plan take into account their specific 
challenges, in particular for the action items that will have the greatest impact for 
developing economies [which includes Action 13], while respecting their sovereignty. 
G20, supra note 44, at 8. 
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the interests of [these] countries . . . are synonymous with those of 
smaller non-G20 countries.”166 
Partly in response to concerns that developing countries did not 
have an adequate role in the BEPS process,167 the OECD modified the 
process leading up to the production of the final reports in October 
2015. Initially, when the BEPS Action Plan was first introduced in 
2013, the OECD explained the project’s methodology and 
incorporation of non-OECD countries as follows: 
Accomplishing the actions set forth in this Action Plan requires an 
effective and comprehensive process that involves all relevant 
stakeholders. To this end, and in order to facilitate greater 
involvement of major non-OECD economies, the “BEPS Project” 
will be launched. In light of the strong interest and support 
expressed on several occasions by the G20, it is proposed that 
interested G20 countries that are not members of the OECD will be 
invited to be part of the project as Associates, i.e. on an equal footing 
with OECD members (including at the level of the subsidiary bodies 
involved in the work on BEPS), and will be expected to associate 
themselves with the outcome of the BEPS Project. Other non-
members could be invited to participate as Invitees on an ad hoc 
basis. Developing countries also face issues related to BEPS, though 
the issues may manifest differently given the specificities of their legal 
and administrative frameworks. The UN participates in the tax work 
of the OECD and will certainly provide useful insights regarding the 
particular concerns of developing countries. The Task Force on Tax 
and Development (TFTD) and the OECD Global Relations 
Programme will provide a useful platform to discuss the specific 
BEPS concerns in the case of developing countries and explore 
possible solutions with all stakeholders. Finally, existing mechanisms 
such as the Global Fora on Tax Treaties, on Transfer Pricing, on VAT 
 
 166. FIXING THE CRACKS IN TAX: A PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 165, at 4. 
 167. The UN Subcommittee on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, created in 2013, seeks 
input from developing countries on the BEPS Project. See United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & 
Soc. Affairs, Subcommittee on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax-committee/tc-subcommitte-beps.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2016). However, a concern emerged that developing countries might be “hesitant to submit 
comments on the . . . project because they are largely left out of the decision-making process.” 
Margaret Burow, Developing Countries Seek Voice on BEPS Treaty Proposals, 74 TAX NOTES INT’L 
114, 114 (2014) (quoting a policy manager with the European Network on Debt 
and Development). 
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and on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
will all be used to involve all countries in the discussions regarding 
possible technical solutions.168 
The OECD hosted regional events in 2014 for developing 
countries to participate in BEPS discussions. 169  However, the 
effectiveness of the opportunity was critiqued on two grounds: (1) the 
inability of some countries to send representatives due to budgetary 
constraints, and (2) the reality that developing countries were not 
participating on equal footing with the OECD and G20 nations.170 
Additionally, in September 2014, the G20 Finance Ministers 
requested that the OECD and others “build on [the] current 
engagement with developing countries and develop a new structured 
dialogue process, with clear avenues for developing countries to work 
together and directly input in the G20/OECD Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting project.” 171  These groups were urged to “work 
together to develop toolkits to assist developing economies implement 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting action items.”172 
Directly acknowledging the G20 call for further involvement of 
developing countries, the OECD announced an expanded role for 
developing countries in the BEPS Project in November 2014. 173 
Under this new format, the OECD identified three key engagements 
with developing countries on BEPS: (1) developing countries from 
various regions and income levels, along with regional tax 
organizations, would be invited to attend meetings of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs (the OECD decision-making body 
regarding the BEPS Project), thereby offering an opportunity for 
direct input, (2) regionally-based networks comprising tax policy and 
administrative offices would be set up for continued dialogue with a 
 
 168. ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
 169. See The BEPS Project and Developing Countries: From Consultation to Participation, 
OECD.ORG (Nov. 2014), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/strategy-deepening-developing-country-
engagement.pdf. 
 170. See, e.g., Margaret Burrow, Developing Countries’ Options Limited in BEPS Discourse, 
75 TAX NOTES INT’L 365, 365 (2014). 
 171. Communiqué, G20, Meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: 
Cairns 4 (Sept. 20–21, 2014), http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000059877.pdf. 
 172. Id. 
 173. The BEPS Project and Developing Countries: From Consultation to Participation, supra 
note 169. 
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broader group of developing countries, and (3) toolkits would be 
developed, with input from the regional networks, to assist developing 
countries in their implementation of BEPS measures.174 
Finally, following the release of the Final BEPS Reports in October 
2015, the OECD in February 2016 announced “a new framework” 
for country participation in updating international tax rules and 
participating in the BEPS Project, called the “Inclusive 
Framework.”175 This Inclusive Framework would enable all interested 
countries to “participate as BEPS Associates in an extension of the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA).”176 Responsive to some 
of the earlier critiques directed at the meaningfulness of the inclusion 
of non-OECD members, the OECD announced that these “BEPS 
Associates . . . will work on an equal footing with the OECD and G20 
members on the remaining standard-setting under the BEPS Project, 
as well as the review and monitoring of the implementation of the 
BEPS package.” 177  Participation requires that the BEPS Associates 
agree to implement the four minimum standards delineated in the 
final BEPS Project recommendations: (1) tackling harmful tax 
practices, (2) confronting treaty shopping, (3) implementing country-
by-country reporting, and (4) improving dispute resolution.178 The 
first meeting under this new framework was held in June 2016 with 
representatives from eighty-two countries and jurisdictions in 
attendance (though only thirty-six had formally committed to joining 
as BEPS Associates).179 However, failure to formally participate does 
not exclude a country from scrutiny of its compliance with the four 
BEPs project minimum standards. The OECD has indicated that 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. All Interested Countries and Jurisdictions to Be Invited to Join Global Efforts Led by the 
OECD and G20 to Close International Tax Loopholes, OECD.ORG (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/all-interested-countries-and-jurisdictions-to-be-invited-to-join-glo
bal-efforts-led-by-the-oecd-and-g20-to-close-international-tax-loopholes.htm. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.; see also OECD, BACKGROUND BRIEF: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR BEPS 
IMPLEMENTATION 5 (2016) (detailing how jurisdictions would participate on an equal 
footing),  https://www.oecd.org/tax/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-imple
mentation.pdf. 
 178. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Inclusive Framework Moving on BEPS 
Implementation, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 32, 32 (2016). 
 179. Id. 
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“economically relevant” jurisdictions will be reviewed “even if those 
countries decline to participate.”180 
The OECD’s introduction of the new inclusive framework and 
new role for developing and other countries has not fully stemmed 
objections to its dominant role in international tax policy. Developing 
countries may not be inclined to commit to the four minimum 
standards required to become BEPS Associates, given that they did 
not participate in the original decision-making process and might find 
the fourth standard (dispute resolution) ill-advised in light of their 
poor past experience with such mechanisms.181 Arguably, other major 
international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, may be positioning themselves for a more 
substantive role in international tax policy on the grounds that they 
are better able to represent the interests of developing countries.182 
Some observers continue to advocate for an enhanced role for the UN 
Committee on Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters 
in an effort to move towards a global tax body. 183  Although the 
international tax landscape continues to evolve, the role of 
international organizations and the question of membership and 
participation remain central in the design and acceptance of emerging 
international tax policy developments. 
C. Summary 
The review of the recent tax transparency and disclosure initiatives 
in Section I.A reveals a series of connected but distinct efforts to 
promote a combination of third-party reporting, taxpayer reporting, 
and exchange of information as the path to enhanced transparency and 
information exchange. For purposes of this Article’s inquiry, however, 
it is important to note that these developments have been at the behest 
 
 180. Rick Mitchell, OECD Will Review ‘Relevant Countries’ Tax Policy Compliance, DAILY 
TAX REP., July 12, 2016, at I-4. 
 181. See Johnston, supra note 178, at 33 (“[M]any states, in particular developing 
countries, have had negative experiences with arbitration of investment disputes and would not 
want to go down that same path with tax issues. . . . [S]ome developing countries have shown 
reluctance toward joining the inclusive framework, as they were not part of the actual decision-
making process during the BEPS project.”). 
 182. Mindy Herzfeld, Should the OECD Take Over the Tax World?, 82 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1032, 1032 (2016). 
 183. Specifically, the issue is whether this UN committee should become an 
intergovernmental tax body. See id.; Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD Proposes Framework for 
BEPS Implementation, 81 TAX NOTES INT’L 727, 728 (2016). 
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of developed country organizations such as the G20, the EU, the 
OECD, and even individual developed countries such as the United 
States. Developed countries have played the dominant role not only 
in setting the agenda, but also in designing the specifics of the various 
new mechanisms. 
As Section I.B discussed, however, developing countries were not 
wholly excluded from influencing these initiatives, and over time there 
have been increasing efforts to integrate them into the planning and 
implementation process. Yet it is only now, after the final BEPS 
reports, that the OECD has introduced another path for developing 
countries to participate in the ongoing BEPS related work on an equal 
footing. To a notable degree, the BEPS framework has already been 
set and many choices made. Developing countries can now have a 
stronger voice in future action, but this comes at the price of having 
to agree to the already-established minimum standards from the BEPS 
Project listed in I.B.4 (harmful tax practices, treaty shopping, CbC 
reporting, and dispute resolution). Some believe that this price—
particularly the requirement that these countries commit to the 
minimum standards for dispute resolution—may be higher than the 
participation right is worth. As part of the BEPS Project, a multilateral 
instrument (the MLI) has been drafted that would allow for more 
streamlined implementation of all BEPS measures that are treaty based 
(as compared to a renegotiation of all bilateral treaties to bring them 
into compliance with the relevant BEPS intiatives). 184  Among the 
provisions included in the MLI is a clause regarding improved dispute 
resolution185—one of the four minimum standards. Although BEPS 
does not make mandatory arbitration a requirement of the 
commitment to improved dispute resolution, the new draft MLI will 
likely include an opt-out binding arbitration clause.186 Commentators 
 
 184. OECD, ACTION 15: A MANDATE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTILATERAL 
INSTRUMENT ON TAX TREATY MEASURES TO TACKLE BEPS 3–7 (2015), https://www. 
oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-15-mandate-for-development-of-multilateral-instrument.pdf. 
 185. Id. at 4; see also Stephanie Soong Johnston, OECD ‘On the Eve’ of  Concluding MLI 
Negotiations, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 1125, 1125 (2016) (noting the likely content of the MLI 
under negotiation). 
 186. Johnston, supra note 185. 
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have voiced concern about arbitration for developing countries. 187 
Mandatory binding arbitration may not be suitable for many 
developing countries,188 which may lack the capacity to successfully 
present their position in an arbitration setting.189 Development of this 
required capacity would come at the cost of resource allocation in 
other arenas. Moreover, some developing countries have already had 
negative experiences in this regard through arbitration of investment 
disputes.190 Even if the MLI language presents mandatory arbitration 
as opt-out, there may be significant pressure on developing countries 
to agree to the provision.191 
Having broadly surveyed developments in transparency and 
disclosure and outlined the primary concerns of developing countries 
in advancing the project, the remainder of this Article takes a closer 
look at the application of key initiatives to developing countries and 
the effects they may have on the decisions and behaviors of 
such countries.  
II. TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AS APPLIED TO 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The new trends in transparency and disclosure bring benefits, 
risks, and uncertainty to all participants. But developing countries face 
a distinct set of possible benefits, risks, and criticism from their 
engagement in these new practices. This Part reviews the major 
transparency and disclosure trends from the perspective of developing 
countries, highlighting the distinctive ways in which they might 
benefit and the special risks they might face. 
 
 187. See, e.g., Stephanie Soong Johnston, Business Reps Neutral on OECD Arbitration 
Style, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 110, 111 (2016) (noting the objections raised on behalf of 
developing countries). 
 188. See BEPS MONITORING GROUP, PRESENTATION AT THE ENLARGED FRAMEWORK ON 
BEPS AT THE OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 3 (2016), https://bepsmonitoring
group.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/presentation-to-cfa-if-june-2016.pdf; see also Johnston, 
supra note 178, at 33 (giving the BEPS Monitoring Group’s position regarding mandatory 
binding arbitration when it says that “the approach adopted so far, especially as regards a 
mandatory binding arbitration procedure, is not suitable for developing countries”). 
 189. See Johnston, supra note 187. 
 190. See BEPS MONITORING GROUP, supra note 189; Johnston, supra note 178, at 33. 
 191. See BEPS MONITORING GROUP, supra note 189; see also Johnston, supra note 187 
(noting concerns about the ability of “opt-out” drafting to protect developing countries). 
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A. BEPS Action 13 
Although the BEPS work is just now being implemented, during 
its development phase there was significant opportunity to debate and 
discuss the operation of the transparency and disclosure program. As 
a result, it is possible to enumerate some of the likely advantages as 
well as risks and limitations for developing countries. 
1. Advantages 
The impetus behind the three-part package (master file, local file, 
and CbC report) of Action 13 is the expectation that all countries 
could benefit from better information and self-reporting by 
multinationals regarding transfer pricing and allocation of profits 
globally.192 But developing countries might benefit specifically from 
the information. Although the benefits outlined below do not accrue 
exclusively to developing countries, on balance it seems plausible that 
these are advantages that would be particularly significant for such 
jurisdictions, especially given the role corporate taxes play in their 
domestic revenue mobilization.193 
 a. Access to information directly from multinationals. The first 
major benefit regards access to the information that would be 
provided by multinationals under the plan. In this realm, three related 
advantages emerge. First, to the extent developing countries suffer 
from limited tax enforcement and audit resources, the global 
expectation (enforced through domestic law) that multinationals 
provide a meaningful business overview, along with local and 
comparative data, allows tax administrators to automatically receive 
those materials and begin their analysis. If some multinationals 
previously resisted providing information, the new globally 
standardized expectations regarding provision of information to the 
tax authorities should lessen these taxpayers complaints about and 
objections to information demands. 
 
 192. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 9–10. 
 193. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVENUE MOBILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
33–37 (2011),  https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/030811.pdf. 
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Second, we can expect that, as the BEPS Action 13 regime is 
implemented, the information furnished will be relatively uniform.194 
This would facilitate the use of such information by the tax 
administrations in developing countries. It would be relatively simple 
for staff to be trained to read and assess a standard set of materials, as 
opposed to an array of idiosyncratic reports submitted by taxpayers. 
Third, if developing countries receive the same master file and CbC 
report that the taxpayer is delivering to all jurisdictions in which it 
operates, their tax administrators may be able to rely on the accuracy 
of the content with a higher degree of confidence than if the data were 
provided only to the developing country. It is likely that a 
multinational would be hesitant to be too creative with numbers that 
will be uniformly evaluated by tax administrators in both developed 
and developing countries.195 
b. Impact on domestic legislation. The second major benefit from 
the Action 13 reporting regime for developing countries derives from 
its possible impact on domestic tax disclosure rules. For jurisdictions 
 
 194. Such uniformity would be due in part to the baseline format provided by Action 13 
for the CbC report and the master file, and in part to the fact that both of these reports would 
be prepared once by the parent company and then shared with the relevant jurisdictions in which 
it operations. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14–16 (explaining the three tiered 
approached to documentation and reporting). 
 195. There certainly remains a risk for the developing country regarding the quality of the 
analysis and materials received. Given that the local file is a package sent specifically and uniquely 
to each jurisdiction, there is no second pair of eyes (much less multiple pairs of eyes) outside that 
country evaluating the filing. However, even those materials theoretically submitted to all 
relevant jurisdictions (the master file and the CbC report) pose several possible risks. First, a 
developing country would only be certain it received the same report as all of the developed 
countries if they all accessed one document. Otherwise there is the potential for different versions 
to be supplied to different countries. This concern seems more realistic if the taxpayer provides 
the master file, for example, in different languages depending on the jurisdiction, or provides 
the CbC report directly to a country that requests it from the taxpayer because the country lacks 
an exchange of information agreement with the taxpayer’s parent jurisdiction. Second, 
developed and developing countries might be looking at the same package with a different focus. 
If the information most significant to developing countries is not compelling for developed 
countries, then the latter may not devote significant energy to its scrutiny. Third, even if a 
developed country, with additional resources and expertise to devote to the review of the filings, 
does determine that there were important errors or inconsistences there is no guarantee nor 
obligation that the country share that new information with other jurisdictions relying on the 
original submissions. 
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that lack sophisticated reporting requirements for multinationals196 
(rules comparable, for example, to the various reporting obligations 
that the United States already imposes on U.S. parented multinational 
groups197), the new regime provides the framework for the rules and 
the underlying expectation that such rules be implemented.  
The Final Report for Action 13 includes three model CAAs, one 
for multilateral agreement and two bilateral agreements to exchange 
CbC reports of multinationals headquartered in the signatories 
jurisdiction (one based on a bilateral tax treaty and the other based on 
a tax information exchange agreement).198 The language of the model 
CAAs provides that the signatories will ensure that their own domestic 
laws require resident multinationals to file an annual CbC report.199 
This commitment is necessary because, unlike the master file and local 
file, which the Final Report suggests be provided directly by taxpayers 
to their relevant jurisdictions, the CbC report will be filed with the 
parent jurisdiction of the multinational, which would then exchange 
the CbC report with appropriate jurisdictions pursuant to a CAA 
executed under an existing treaty. 200 In all cases, the model CAAs 
anticipate that signatories would have in place or would implement 
under domestic law a requirement that their own multinationals file 
CbC reports, which could then be exchanged under the agreement: 
“Whereas, the laws of their respective Jurisdictions require or are 
expected to require the Reporting Entity of an MNE Group to 
annually file a CbC Report.”201 The annex to the Final Report also 
includes model domestic legislation to facilitate the process of 
conforming domestic laws to the expected CbC requirement.202 This 
suggests that tax administrations seeking domestic legislative support 
for rules requiring specific reporting by multinationals may get a boost 
from the combination of an available international framework that can 
be adopted, the requirement that conforming domestic laws be 
 
 196.   Developing countries vary widely, and some do not presently have comprehensive 
international tax substantive rules, much less disclosure rules. See, e.g., PHYLISS LAI LAN MO, 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND ANTI-AVOIDANCE MEASURES IN MAJOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 12 
(2003) (observing that tax statutes and regulations in developing countries are often “skimpy”). 
 197. See, e.g., IRS FORM 5471 (2015) (requiring certain U.S. owners of controlled foreign 
corporations to file specific information with the IRS). 
 198. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 45. 
 199. Id. at 31. 
 200. Id. at 20–21. 
 201. Id. at 45, 59, 65. 
 202. Id. at 39. 
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implemented to take advantage of this framework, and global 
momentum for this type of multinational disclosure. 
c. Tax enforcement resources. A third major benefit from the Action 
13 plan is its potential to help shape domestic conversations about tax 
policy and allocation of resources. To the extent that significant and 
possibly useful tax information might be forthcoming from 
multinationals on a regular basis, tax authorities may find themselves 
in a position to argue for more enforcement resources. Relatedly, the 
effectiveness of enforcement may be enhanced by the new 
information, which may allow resources to be more usefully deployed 
to generate revenues and compliance. Developing countries might 
also be pushed to rethink their approaches to specific international tax 
issues, such as transfer pricing and other special arrangements. For 
example, if in the past the tax authorities found that they lacked the 
substantive law to challenge certain transactions, or faced political 
resistance to the examination of certain taxpayers, the prospect of a 
new norm and the increased capacity to administer the tax system (due 
to improved information) may generate a new domestic conversation 
regarding enforcement priorities in international tax policy. 
2. Risks and limitations 
Action 13’s contribution to transparency and disclosure is not 
without risk and limitations, both for developing countries and for the 
multinationals subject to the regime. 
a. Limitations on developing country upside. From the developing 
country perspective, the introduction of the new reporting regime 
could overstate the boon to tax enforcement and disguise, at least for 
some time, continuing challenges. First, lack of the type of 
information that Action 13 provides has not been the sole problem 
facing developing country tax administrations. Substantive areas of tax 
law, including rules governing capital assets and tax holidays (i.e. tax 
competition), also pose difficulties.203 These areas remain unaddressed 
by the transparency and disclosure steps, but still warrant attention. 
Second, if a developing country participates in the Action 13 plan 
and receives valuable information from multinationals, they are 
 
 203. See, e.g., Vito Tanzi & Howell Zee, Tax Policy for Developing Countries, IMF.ORG 
(Mar. 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues27/ (noting issues in the use 
of tax holidays and in taxing investment capital in developing countries). 
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effectively stepping up their international tax enforcement efforts. Tax 
audit staff will gain further experience on international tax questions 
while multinationals operating in the jurisdiction will experience 
increased interactions with the local tax authorities on these questions. 
It would not be surprising to see an increase in the efforts of 
multinationals to attract trained tax enforcement staff from local tax 
administrations, exacerbating the drain on skilled government tax 
personnel. This possibility does not militate against participation, but 
it does suggest planning for evolving staffing needs that might be 
triggered by the new regime. Given limited resources, increased 
allocation of resources to multinational taxation might reduce 
resources for domestic enforcement, including domestic consumption 
tax and SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) enforcement. 
Third, the G20’s request for outside support to developing 
country tax administrations may ultimately be harder to satisfy and less 
likely to receive support from developed countries than other elements 
of the G20’s BEPS message. Yet many developing countries may need 
significant domestic reform before they can begin participating in the 
new world of information exchange (whether Action 13, or the 
automatic exchange discussed in the following section). 204  These 
jurisdictions must establish domestic law rules regarding taxpayer 
disclosure obligations and taxpayer data protection, and then 
implement procedures that effectively provide the required level of 
privacy and protection. Once they participate, these jurisdictions must 
be able to meaningfully evaluate the information that they receive. 
Thus, tax auditors must have the language and other skills necessary 
to be able to access the documents exchanged or submitted, as well as 
the technical skill to take the information in the disclosure and use it 
to identify problem areas for the taxpayer and determine appropriate 
next steps in the audit. 
b. Issues of concern to multinationals. Multinationals, too, have 
expressed a number of concerns regarding developing country 
participation in the Action 13 disclosure program. Perhaps the 
 
 204. See Lien Hoang, Asian Bank Prods Poor Nations to Join Global Tax Campaigns, 25 
TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 339, 339 (2016) (noting that the Asian Development Bank 
contended that a “focus on less prosperous countries is necessary because they ‘lack the resources 
and expertise to comply with international standards for tax transparency and to protect domestic 
tax bases against aggressive forms of tax planning’”). 
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primary articulated concern is how developing countries will use the 
information received from the master file, local file, and especially 
from the CbC report. 205  In particular, taxpayers fear that such 
jurisdictions will use the data received as a short cut to a tax 
adjustment and will fail to engage in the full transfer pricing analysis 
that would otherwise be expected.206 A jurisdiction with limited audit 
resources that sees evidence that other countries are receiving a larger 
allocation of the multinational group’s revenue might forgo resource-
consuming audit steps to arrive at an audit position that seems self-
evident or defensible based on the CbC data (despite the exhortation 
in the BEPs report that the CbC data only be used for 
risk assessment).207 
Taxpayers have also indicated concern that the disclosure program 
will lead to tax adjustments for related party transactions based not on 
the arm’s length standard, but rather on formulary apportionment, 
particularly given the multi-factor CbC report, which is reminiscent 
of formulary apportionment based on sales, assets, and payroll.208 This 
shift towards formulary apportionment could occur indirectly by 
shaping government thinking in working with the new information 
and audit adjustment. Alternatively, the shift could occur directly, by 
leading developing countries to advocate more explicitly for a 
formulary approach to transfer pricing, perhaps one based on data in 
the soon-to-be ubiquitous CbC Reports.209 
 
 205. See, e.g., Herzfeld, supra note 103, at 850–51. 
 206. See, e.g., id. at 851. 
 207. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 
 208. See, e.g., Herzfeld, supra note 103, at 851. 
 209. See Toby Quantrill, End Transnationals’ $212 Billion Tax Dodge on Poorest Countries, 
ECOLOGIST (June 5, 2015), http://www.theecologist.org/campaigning/2896978/end_
transnationals_12_billion_tax_dodge_on_poorest_countries.html (discussing the newly released 
report of the Independent Commission on the Reform of International Corporate Taxation 
(ICRICT) which advocates the end of separate entity taxation of multinationals and the 
introduction of taxation on a single entity basis (i.e. formulary)); Christian Aid Welcomes Call 
For a Global Tax System That Works For All, CHRISTIANAID.ORG (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/june_2015/christian-aid-welcomes-
call-for-a-global-tax-system-that-works-for-all.aspx (reporting on the same ICRICT report and 
supporting developing country efforts to challenge existing international tax rules that allow 
multinationals to significantly reduce taxes paid to developing countries). 
1767 Developing Countries in an Age of Transparency and Disclosure 
 1817 
The other major risk area identified by multinationals is taxpayer 
privacy and confidentiality. 210  Taxpayers have questioned whether 
developing countries would be able to adequately protect the 
important data that would be transmitted under the Action 13 
disclosure program. 211  Given that participation in the regime (i.e. 
signing a competent authority agreement to exchange CbC Reports 
under a multilateral or bilateral treaty) is premised on demonstrating 
adequate privacy rules and practices, presumably the real complaint 
must be all, or at least one, of the following: (1) jurisdictions that do 
not qualify to participate formally in the CbC exchange under the plan 
will nonetheless demand the CbC report during audit from the local 
entity, (2) the master file and local file are not provided via an 
international agreement but are to be delivered by the taxpayer 
directly to the countries, 212  thus bypassing any obligation to 
demonstrate compliance with standards of taxpayer privacy and 
confidentiality, (3) treaty partners of developing countries will not 
hold developing countries to appropriate privacy standards, and (4) 
even developing countries that nominally have the proper privacy 
structures and rules in place will lack the intent or resources to carry 
through with the commitment to the expected standards. 
 
 210. See, e.g., Bill Brennan, BEPS Country-by-Country Reporting: The Practical Impact for 
Corproate Tax Departments, THETAXADVISER.COM (May 1, 2015), http://www.thetaxadviser. 
com/issues/2015/jun/brennan-june15.html (“There is also the lurking vulnerability of 
confidential information mismanagement between governments, as well as information transfer 
and cross-border sharing security risk, which is too apparent to be ignored. With the number of 
governments that will be receiving this information on an annual basis, leaks to the press are 
inevitable. It is also possible that, in the future, a government will pass laws requiring the 
information be made publicly available. Therefore, the question is whether taxpayers can rely on 
governments to keep their information secure and assure confidentiality, and whether they can 
depend on countries’ installing the appropriate safeguards and information-transfer controls.”). 
 211. See, e.g., id. The issue of developing countries’ capacity to protect data can be viewed 
as a problem for the developing countries if it prevents them from gaining access to CbC data. 
Alternatively, it can be a problem for taxpayers if developing countries are given access to CbC 
data without sufficient scrutiny of their systems and rules for data protection. See Marie Sapirie, 
IRS Concerned About Implementing CbC Reporting, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 744, 745 (2015) (“In 
anticipation of the 2020 review [of BEPS CbC], there need to be standards for what coutnries 
should look for as they monitor and review other countries, [David] Varley [acting director of 
transfer pricing operations in the IRS Large Business and International Divison] said. He added 
that although the U.S. is well situated to build the necessary systems, he sympathizes with 
developing countries that don’t have the same level of resources.”). 
 212. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 20. 
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There are no simple responses to these concerns. The first two 
points are undoubtedly valid, although arguably countries could 
already have requested the information in the past.213 The second two 
points identify possible failures on the part of either country involved 
in an agreement to exchange information. It is worth pointing out 
that multinationals would have recourse to their own tax 
administrations in the event that abuses or lapses arise with 
developing  country treaty partners, whether due to intent or 
administrative failure.214 
One highly controversial privacy question concerning Action 13 is 
whether the data (particularly the CbC report) should be made 
public. 215  Though not specifically a developing country issue, the 
public disclosure debate implicates developing countries which are 
imagined to be a likely beneficiary of such disclosure. Of course, under 
the Action 13 Final Report there is no plan for public disclosure, and 
privacy is extensively addressed. 216  Multinationals, however, cannot 
have missed the campaign in some quarters to make the information 
public. 217  Most recently, the government of the United Kingdom 
accepted an amendment to a Finance Bill that “will enable HM 
Treasury to make regulations requiring large multinationals to publish 
country-by-country (CbC) reports of their profits and taxes.” 218 
 
 213. It would, however, be fair to argue that this possibility is greater now that actual 
reports will exist (master file and CbC report), or that country specific reports could be prepared 
(local file) according to the new clearly established format under Action 13. 
 214. To the extent CbC information was provided to the developing country via treaty, 
then the exchange would be premised on compliance with and commitment to various data 
protection standards. Failure to comply with those standards would be subject to challenge by 
the taxpayer’s own jurisdiction. See ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 62, 68. 
 215. See, e.g., Stephanie Soong Johnston, G-20 Officials Warn Against Public Country-by-
Country Reporting, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 383 (2016). 
 216. See e.g., ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
 217. See, e.g.,  Ryan Finley, NGOs Urge Treasury, IRS to Make CbC Reports Public, 82 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 765 (2016). 
 218. Andrew Goodall, U.K. Paves the Way for Public CbC Reporting but Stresses 
Multilateral Approach, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.taxnotes.com/
worldwide-tax-daily/information-reporting/uk-paves-way-public-cbc-reporting-stresses-multi
lateral-approach/2016/09/07/18589306; see also Penny Sukhraj, U.K. Opts for Public 
Country-by-Country Reporting, BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL: TREASURY AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/u-k-opts-
public-country-country-reporting/; Vanessa Houlder, MPs Claim Corporate Tax Transparency 
Victory, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9282cd9a-7444-
11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.html#axzz4K4tB8VWm. 
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Although this legislation does not itself require public disclosure of 
CbC reports but rather authorizes the government to issue regulations 
requiring disclosure, the move marks a dramatic step towards public 
reporting. Perhaps in an effort to dampen concern over the impact of 
the provision, the U.K. government has indicated that it would seek 
international agreement on an appropriate model for public reporting 
of data before acting on its new powers.219 
Some of the rationales for public disclosure apply across 
jurisdictions, such as the desire to have a well-informed populace that 
can evaluate the effectiveness of tax administration and tax rules in 
their own jurisdiction. 220 Other rationales may be more compelling in 
the context of developing countries. For example, if such jurisdictions 
have limited resources to assess and evaluate the incoming data from 
multinationals under the Action 13 plan, interested international 
organizations or third parties could also review the data and offer their 
comments, analyses, and perspectives to the broader public and to the 
under-resourced developing country’s tax administration. 
Furthermore, if a jurisdiction considers corruption to be a non-
negligible risk, then public disclosure of a multinational’s tax position 
may reduce pressure for special tax arrangements.221 Moreover, public 
disclosure makes it possible to compare the revenues collected with 
the jurisdiction’s budget expenditures in order to identify possible 
sources of corruption. Finally, public access to the data would make it 
available to all developing countries regardless of their formal 
participation in exchange of information agreements.222 At present, 
 
 219. Goodall, supra note 218. 
 220. See Alex Cobham, OECD Country-By-Country Reporting: Only For the Strong, 
UNCOUNTED (Sept. 14, 2015), http://uncounted.org/2015/09/14/oecd-country-by-
country-reporting-only-for-the-strong/ (suggesting that public disclosure enables “investors, 
analysts, journalists or activitists the opportunity to hold multinational accountable”) 
 221. For example, in the extractive industries, a move towards public disclosure of 
payments made to governments is intended to provide transparency and help address corruption. 
See Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, Public Statement: Enhancing the Transparency of Resource 
Extraction Revenue Payments, SEC.GOV (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
statement/disclosure-of-payments-by-resource-extraction-issuers.html. 
 222. See, e.g., Budget Tax Reforms Leave Poor Countries Out in the Cold, Says Christian Aid, 
CHRISTIANAID.ORG.UK (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.christianaid.org.uk/pressoffice/press
releases/march_2015/budget-tax-reforms-leave-poor-countries-out-in-the-cold-says-christian-
aid.aspx (stating that the UK should require public reporting of CbC data because “[f]ailure to 
do this means few developing countries will benefit from the information being given to the 
UK’s tax authority”). 
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CbC reports would be made available to jurisdiction via a treaty 
mechanism (the report would be filed with the multinational’s parent 
jurisdiction which would then share the report with relevant 
jurisdictions pursuant to their treaty terms).223 However, to the extent 
developing countries lack an extensive network of bilateral treaties or 
TIEAs, their participation in the new world of CbC data will 
be curtailed. 
Independent of concerns grounded in privacy and data protection, 
multinationals have argued that many jurisdictions will not be able to 
meaningfully use the material that businesses are being asked to 
prepare and provide.224 Presumably, the claim here is that the net result 
is an unjustified burden because it does not advance tax enforcement 
efforts but imposes a burden on the complying taxpayer. Ultimately, 
though, it is not clear how far this burden argument extends. The 
master file and CbC report would be expected by every (participating) 
jurisdiction in which the multinational operates, and certainly some of 
them will be able to use the information effectively. In that case, the 
only potential waste or burden derives from sending the materials to 
additional jurisdictions that are unable to make the same use of it. The 
local file, however, would be prepared individually for a country. Thus, 
one might argue that preparing a local file for a jurisdiction that cannot 
and will not use it is inefficient. Assessments of inefficiency, though, 
should not be measured by a static snapshot of current capacity to use 
data. As noted above, one anticipated benefit for developing countries 
from the Action 13 package is its ability to spur developing country 
domestic legislation, resource allocation, and effective auditing. 
B. Automatic Exchange of Information 
For developing countries, the dominant mechanism for automatic 
exchange of information will be the OECD’s automatic exchange of 
information under the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), as 
implemented by CAAs through the Multilateral Convention. Many of 
the benefits and the concerns that arise regarding developing countries 
in this context are broadly the same as those discussed above for 
Action 13. However, their precise details may differ. 
 
 223. ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14–23. 
 224. See, e.g., Herzfeld, supra note 103, at 850 (“The notion that the information being 
requested greatly exceeds what is needed to perform an appropriate risk assessment is reflected 
in virtually all the comments the OECD has received from the business community.”) 
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1. Benefits: More reliable access to information 
One benefit for developing countries from participation in 
automatic exchange is the ability to secure information that would be 
burdensome or impossible to acquire (due, for example, to bars on 
“fishing expeditions” in exchanges on request) under an existing 
bilateral treaty or tax information exchange agreement. 225  For 
jurisdictions that rely substantially on an income tax, tax evasion is a 
significant problem and access to the kind of account information 
provided through automatic exchange would be valuable. 226 
Moreover, the broad scope of the information provided further 
enhances the exchange program. For example, automatic information 
exchange would yield data on entity accounts, not just individual 
taxpayer accounts.227 If a jurisdiction has historically faced corruption 
or pressure on the tax administration, the automatic nature of the 
information delivery guarantees that a participating jurisdiction will 
receive account information, leaving the government only with the 
decision to act on the information received. 
2. Risks and limitations 
a. Domestic law changes required. As with the Action 13 program, 
developing countries must implement a specified set of domestic law 
changes regarding taxpayer privacy and data protection in order to 
participate in automatic exchange. Inability to do so bars them from 
participation. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the 
developing countries must commit providing information to their 
treaty partners, i.e. the agreement to engage in automatic exchange of 
 
 225. See, e.g., Robert Goulder, Should the U.S. Adopt the OECD’s Common Reporting 
Standard?, FORBES.COM (June 29, 2016, 11:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
taxanalysts/2016/06/29/should-the-u-s-adopt-the-oecds-common-reporting-standard/#605
e17de6af8 (noting the difference between bilateral treaties and restrictions regarding “fishing 
expeditions” and potential flow of information to governments under CRS). 
 226. According to one analysis, tax havens that facilitate hidden offshore accounts 
negatively impact many developing countries, which suffer tax losses representing a higher 
percentage of their GDP than developed countries. New SwissLeaks Analysis Reveals How Tax 
Haven Secrecy Harms Developing Countries, CHRISTIANAID.ORG (Sept. 30, 2015), http:// 
www.christianaid.org.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/september_2015/new-swissleaks-analysis-
reveals-how-tax-haven-secrecy-harms-developing-countries.aspx. 
 227. OECD, COMMON REPORTING STANDARD, supra note 44, at 16 (discussing reporting 
and due diligence requirements regarding entity accounts). 
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information is reciprocal.228 Under Action 13, in comparison, only the 
CbC reports would be subject to treaty-based direct exchange 
between jurisdictions.229 And in that case, underlying reports and data 
would not be the product of tax administration effort. Rather the 
jurisdiction would commit to implementing rules requiring its 
multinationals to prepare and file the reports with them, and would 
commit to sharing that information with other jurisdictions. Arguably, 
that more passive role for the tax administration in the CbC process 
may be easier for a developing country to meet than the more active 
role established in automatic exchange. 
In recognition of this difference, some have advocated for a 
nonreciprocal approach to automatic exchange of information for 
developing countries, at least on an interim basis. 230 Under that frame, 
a developing country would need to meet the standards for data 
protection and confidentiality, but, at least for some window of time, 
would not need to be able to provide reciprocal data in order to 
receive data. 
b. Participation from key jurisdictions. For automatic exchange to 
be effective, developing countries must be able to obtain exchange 
commitments from the jurisdictions in which its taxpayers are most 
likely to have accounts. Despite the availability of a multilateral CAA 
under the Multilateral Convention, which reduces the number of 
 
 228. Although the OECD drafted a model competent authority automatic exchange of 
information agreement that is not reciprocal, that is intended to cover situations in which a 
jurisdiction does not impose an income tax and thus does not need the information. There is no 
comparable provision for temporary or permanent nonreciprocal automatic exchange of 
informnation between a developed and developing country. See OECD, STANDARD FOR 
AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE, supra note 52, at 215, 223; see also Press Release, Tax Justice Network, 
New OECD Report on Automatic Information Exchange: Will Developing Countries Be Left 
Out? (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.taxjustice.net/2014/02/13/press-release-tjn-responds-
new-oecd-report-automatic-information-exchange/ (critiquing the requirement of reciprocity). 
 229. See ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 20–21 (reviewing the filing process 
for the CbC reports). 
 230. Proposals for ways to mitigate the exclusive focus on reciprocity, at least for 
developing countries, have been offered. See, e.g., Urinov, supra note 115, at 13 (detailing the 
problem and noting the option of “staged reciprocity” suggested by the Tax Justice Network); 
see also TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, OECD’S AUTOMATIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARD: 
A WATERSHED MOMENT FOR FIGHTING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION? 7 (2014), 
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/pdfs/TJN2014_OECD-AIE-Report.pdf (“There 
should be model provisions for staged reciprocity, for which developing countries would 
be eligible.”). 
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agreements that must be negotiated, there is skepticism regarding the 
ability of developing countries to secure the commitment of those 
jurisdictions with which they most want exchange. 231  Signatories 
otherwise obligated to exchange can rely on a number of techniques 
to avoid exchange with participating jurisdictions.232 Also, in many 
cases, important exchange jurisdictions have not joined as signatories. 
These nonparticipants may include jurisdictions often classified as tax 
havens, as well as some countries that may not always attract that 
moniker (such as the United States).233 
This limitation is somewhat different from the participation 
challenge regarding Action 13. With respect to Action 13, the major 
jurisdictions from which a developing country would be seeking 
information (though the CbC report) would be the parent jurisdiction 
of the multinational operating in their country. This will frequently be 
a developed, capital-exporting country. Such countries, some of which 
have been active BEPS participants, may be more inclined to 
participate in the Action 13 exchange than tax havens would be to 
participate in automatic exchange. 
C. Summary 
Although both developed and developing countries can benefit 
from the transparency and disclosure wrought by BEPS Action 13 and 
automatic exchange, the discussion above highlights the ways in which 
developing countries might get an extra enforcement boost. The fact 
that developing countries are likely to have more limited audit 
resources and less extensive domestic infrastructure and taxpayer 
reporting requirements suggests they may reap potentially significant 
 
 231. See, e.g., Urinov, supra note 115, at 9–14 (detailing the ways in which countries might 
avoid signing on to a multilateral CAA). 
 232. See, e.g., id. at 9–12 (detailing the ways in which countries might avoid true 
participation and exchange with some countries). 
 233. The United States has taken the position that exchange of information in the context 
of FATCA and the related IGAs will constitute its method for committing to and performing 
automatic exchange of financial account information. OECD, supra note 61, at 1 n.1 (“The 
United States has indicated that it is undertaking automatic information exchanges pursuant to 
FATCA from 2015 and has entered into intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) with other 
jurisdictions to do so. The Model 1A IGAs entered into by the United States acknowledge the 
need for the United States to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information 
exchange with partner jurisdictions. They also include a political commitment to pursue the 
adoption of regulations and to advocate and support relevant legislation to achieve such 
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.”). 
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gains from joining these transparency and disclosure initiatives. But 
there are also possible negative effects, including questions about 
developing countries’ realistic ability to participate, the potential for 
participation in the regimes to mask other problems, misuse of 
information, and failure to use the data provided. 
III. DEVELOPING COUNTRY STRATEGIES IN A TRANSPARENCY AND 
DISCLOSURE WORLD 
As explored in Part II, developing countries face a combination of 
benefits, risks, and consequences from participating in the emerging 
tax transparency and disclosure practices. The new mechanisms 
provide momentum, structure, and support for a developing country’s 
own efforts to improve its domestic law, infrastructure, and tax 
enforcement efforts. Yet, the global trend simultaneously threatens to 
leave some countries behind to the extent that they are either unable 
to meet the requirements to participate to effectively utilize the 
information that they receive. Even for countries attempting to 
participate, their ability to join the transparency and disclosure 
movement could at least temporarily disguise their continuing 
challenges in effective tax administration in other areas. 
Additionally, before these mechanisms have even been 
implemented, developing countries have faced scrutiny from 
multinationals challenging their ability to protect data and privacy and 
to use the information in the agreed manner. This Part argues that the 
same characteristics of developing countries that make participation 
especially beneficial also create risks that developing countries will not 
benefit (a neutral result), be harmed, or potentially cause harm to 
others. In addition, this Part identifies a series of factors that will 
dictate whether joining the transparency and disclosure trend is likely 
to be a net positive or negative for developing countries. To the extent 
they can actively manage these pressure points, developing countries 
increase the likelihood that the new transparency and disclosure 
mechanism will benefit them. 
A. Dual Edge of Developing Country Characteristics 
One critical thread running through analysis of developing 
country participation in the new transparency and disclosure 
mechanisms is their ability to improve their capacity sufficiently.The 
capacity question is common across virtually all developing countries 
and provides the seed for both their unique ability to benefit from 
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transparency and disclosure efforts and their distinct potential to 
struggle under the new regimes. 
1. Benefit 
While there have been longstanding efforts from both 
international organizations and from individual countries over the 
years to provide various kinds of capacity-building support to 
developing countries, 234 the recent work on the BEPS Project has 
focused additional attention on capacity building. On April 19, 2016, 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the OECD, and 
the United Nations announced their joint engagement on a Platform 
for Collaboration on Tax.235 The Concept Note that accompanied the 
four groups’ announcement emphasizes the collaboration that will 
take place among these major international organizations in providing 
support and assistance to developing countries.236  
Not everyone has viewed the announced platform project with 
optimism, however. For example, Oxfam’s tax policy expert 
cautioned: “This global tax platform represents a step in a long road 
towards building a fairer and more transparent tax system. The 
platform must be able to deliver tangible results and combat 
inequality, but most importantly, it must give the poorest countries a 
voice in all discussions and agreements. For too long, the concerns of 
 
 234. See, e.g., Tax Inspectors Without Borders, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.org/tax/
taxinspectors.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2016); Press Release, Dep’t for Int’l Dev. et al., UK Plans 
Major Boost to Tax Collection in Developing Countries (Nov. 20, 2013), https:// www. 
gov.uk/government/news/uk-plans-major-boost-to-tax-collection-in-developing-countries; 
United Nations Capacity Development Programme on International Tax Cooperation: Progress 
Report,  Newsletter of FfDO/DESA (Fin. for Dev. Office, New York, N.Y.), Number 2014/5, 
June 2014, at 1, 1; U.N. Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Overview of 
Cooperation on Capacity Building in Taxation, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2010/CRP.11 (Oct.. 11, 
2010), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/sixthsession/OverviewCapacityBldg.pdf; Capacity-
Building Tools, TAXJUSTICEAFRICA.NET, http://www.taxjusticeafrica.net/en/resources/
downloads/capacity-building-tools/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
 235. See Press Release No. 16/176, Int’l Monetary Fund, International Organizations 
Take Major Step to Boost Global Cooperation in Tax Matters (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr16176. 
 236. INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., THE PLATFORM FOR COLLABORATION ON TAX: 
CONCEPT NOTE 5 (2016), http://www.imf.org/~/media/Websites/IMF/Imported/
external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/_pr16176pdf.ashx (“The overarching aim for cooperation 
among the [four groups] is to better support governments in addressing the tax challenges 
they  face.”). 
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developing countries have been outweighed by those of powerful and 
wealthy governments and business interests.”237 
Still, if the recent transparency and disclosure efforts could bring 
about significant improvement in actual administrative tax capacity, 
this would be a significant value added. The Platform founders 
recognize the difficulty of this task.238 It remains to be seen whether 
the currently planned steps of the Platform, which include training 
manuals and toolkits specifically requested by the G20 Developing 
Working Group, 239  will add significantly to developing country 
technical capacities. 
As discussed, 240  in order for countries to participate in 
transparency and disclosure mechanisms, they must satisfy the 
required domestic law minimum standards regarding privacy and 
protection of data and, in the context of BEPS Action 13, put in place 
reporting requirements for their own multinationals. Additionally, 
they must join the appropriate international agreements. For 
developing countries constrained by various capacity limitations, these 
very requirements (including their specificity and global application) 
may facilitate the country’s ability to satisfy them; for example, if they 
provide a political boost to tax authorities’ requests for domestic law 
reform and budgetary support, or if they result in allocation of 
resources to satisfying these standards and agreements. Moreover, by 
prescribing clearly defined expectations and standards regarding 
privacy and data protection, or taxpayer reporting requirements, the 
new regimes offer clear goals for domestic law and available models 
for revision and adoption. 
If developing countries are able to participate in transparency and 
disclosure mechanisms by taking the above steps, the potential 
benefits, including the ability to access, verify, and process information 
that historically was difficult for developing countries to secure 
 
 237. Simon Hernandez-Arthur, Success of “Global Tax Platform” Hinges on How Well It 
Represents Developing Countries and Fights Inequality, OXFAM.ORG (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/reactions/success-global-tax-platform-hinges-how-
well-it-represents-developing-countries. 
 238. IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, observed that the platform will “not 
produce miracles.” Stephanie Soong Johnston, International Organizations to Reveal Tax 
Cooperation Platform, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www. 
taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/international-organi
zations-reveal-tax-cooperation-platform/2016/04/19/18462931. 
 239. INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., supra note 236, at 4. 
 240. See, e.g., supra Section I.A.2.a and  Section II.A.2.b. 
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because of their limited capacity, may now be within reach. In this way, 
the transparency and disclosure mechanisms, which are expected to 
benefit all jurisdictions, could provide an enhanced benefit to 
developing countries more constrained in their options prior to the 
new regimes. 
In summary, the transparency and disclosure regimes may be 
beneficial to capacity-constrained developing countries because the 
ways in which these regimes offer assistance to or incentivize behaviors 
by such countries map directly onto these capacity problems and help 
alleviate them. The following examples highlight this notion: 
Problem Solution 
Limited domestic support 
for multinational reporting 
requirements and/or 
 effective substantive 
rules for addressing 
multinational tax planning 
Global attention to transparency and 
disclosure may raise the profile of 
the  issue and of the available 
administrative and substantive law 
options 
Limited requirements for 
disclosure by business and 
taxpayers under domestic 
law 
The new regimes spell out what 
should be provided in disclosure by 
businesses 
Developing countries have 
limited leverage to demand 
disclosures 
Disclosures are made automatically, 
and often go to multiple states, thus 
 increasing the likelihood that the 
disclosures will be made and will be 
 reasonably accurate 
Inadequate resources to 
obtain documents from 
taxpayers and secure 
 information via 
exchange on request under 
bilateral treaties 
No need to pressure taxpayers to 
prepare documentation, because 
Action 13 ensures preparation and 
delivery of information, as it will also 
be   delivered to other countries 
with more leverage and enforcement 
  resources 
Limited training, support, 
and resources 
Limited range of formats for 
provision of information may 
facilitate training staff to work with 
the standardized data sets provided 
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2. Risks and harms 
Yet the very same capacity limitations that may cause developing 
countries to uniquely benefit from the transparency and disclosure 
trends may lead to failure or harm. First, in the case of automatic 
exchange, jurisdictions must not only agree to various domestic law 
reforms and provisions but must also be able to affirmatively bear the 
administrative burden of gathering, organizing, and sharing 
information under what is expected to be a reciprocal regime. This 
additional burden may prove too large a leap in capacity for 
jurisdictions that heretofore have struggled in their own domestic tax 
enforcement. Absent agreement by treaty partners to temporarily 
accept non-reciprocal information exchange and permit developing 
countries to automatically receive information without providing it, 
developing countries that cannot (with assistance) meet the domestic 
legislation obligations regarding privacy and data protection will 
ultimately be excluded from the exchange process because the 
required capacity building is currently beyond their reach. 241  In 
essence, the regime would create a cliff effect. Jurisdictions with just 
enough capacity to participate have the opportunity to significantly 
improve their tax enforcement, whereas those unable to meet that 
threshold would be excluded altogether. 
Second, developing countries participating in the BEPS Action 13 
may find that the pressures created by their still-limited enforcement 
capacity may lead them to take the information gathered through the 
CbC reporting and use it as a backstop where transfer pricing analysis 
is too burdensome. As noted earlier, auditing a multinational’s transfer 
pricing requires technically trained tax compliance and enforcement 
staff. Where such staff is limited, whether due to budget constraints, 
technological resources, private sector poaching, or linguistic facility, 
the audit team may be inclined to use the more easily accessible 
information and factors on the CbC report to determine the proper 
allocation of profits and losses among related parties. Although some 
advocates of formulary apportionment may deem this an acceptable 
form of self-help, other tax observers and most multinationals would 
likely see it as a violation of the agreed terms of the BEPS Action 
13 package. 
 
 241. Proposals for ways to mitigate the exclusive focus on reciprocity, at least for 
developing countries, were noted supra note 230. 
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Beyond the possibility of too much reliance (implicit or otherwise) 
on the CbC data to shape an audit position, developing countries may 
find themselves (1) advocating more strongly for a shift toward 
formulary apportionment or (2) urging public disclosure of data to 
create public momentum, to facilitate indirect oversight and scrutiny 
by international organizations, and to counteract corruption or other 
personal pressures. These two points, unlike others considered here, 
are negative only from the perspective of certain actors in the 
international tax arena. With regard to formulary apportionment, 
advocates of this transfer pricing alternative would likely consider such 
developments a positive outcome. However, multinationals, countries 
not advocating formulary, and those tax analysts who view formulary 
as an unrealistic solution to the underlying problems created by 
multinational tax planning would not welcome renewed attention to 
the subject. Similarly, with regard to public disclosure of multinational 
tax data, the multinationals themselves are unlikely to support such a 
move, but various tax advocacy groups would consider such public 
releases a welcome and necessary policy shift. Governments would be 
expected to hold varying views, as evidenced by the United Kingdom’s 
move in early September 2016 towards public disclosure of 
CbC reports.242 
Third, countries with perhaps even more limited capacity and 
resources may find themselves receiving information (in particular the 
local file) that they ultimately are not in a position to evaluate and use 
in an audit process. Thus, rather than posing a risk of using material 
in a manner considered outside the agreed scope of, say, BEPS Action 
13, these jurisdictions would simply fail to process the data at all. 
Multinationals arguing this point rely on the limited processing and 
enforcement capacity of developing countries to justify not providing 
information at all. However, even the more developed countries are 
not immune to arguments that they may impose burdens through 
these transparency and disclosure regimes and then fail to use the data 
in a meaningful audit process. Additionally, this objection to increased 
transparency and disclosure mechanisms adopts a relatively static view 
of states and their capacity, and relies on that static view to argue 
against increased provision of information. It is certainly plausible that 
with the reality of data to support investigations and analysis, countries 
will more effectively manage this audit and tax enforcement resource. 
 
 242. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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Fourth, to the extent that developing countries with limited 
capacity are able to engage somewhat effectively in the transparency 
and disclosure process, international organizations and developed 
countries may lose sight of the fact that participation should not be 
equated with completed capacity building. Rather, capacity is a 
sweeping term that encompasses a range of resources, skills, 
infrastructure, and background rules. Participating countries may be 
viewed as successes unlikely to need substantial administrative 
assistance on a forward-looking basis. However, if this prediction is 
wrong, countries may lose valuable momentum and resources for their 
broader tax-related capacity building. 
Developing countries may find themselves in a somewhat 
conflicted position vis à vis the transparency and disclosure trends. The 
very aspects of constrained capacity that may characterize their current 
tax administration and enforcement may render them particularly 
likely to benefit from participation in the new regimes, but 
simultaneously create the foundation for the risks generated by their 
participation. This observation serves not as a recommendation 
against participation but rather as a notice of the importance of 
continued support and capacity building throughout the process, not 
simply in the preparatory stages for participation. The next Section, 
building in part on an understanding of both the advantages and the 
challenges of transparency and disclosure for developing countries, 
identifies the pressure points in the evolving transparency and 
disclosure trends that must be managed to ensure that developing 
countries can participate in the new transparency and disclosure 
regimes and do so successfully. 
B. Managing the Pressure Points 
The analyses in Parts I and II regarding the new transparency and 
disclosure regimes, the distinct circumstances of developing countries, 
and the intersection of these features, illuminate a series of factors and 
trigger points that will significantly impact the ability of developing 
countries to meaningfully benefit from the new international tax 
trends. Such factors include (1) the specific transparency and 
disclosure mechanism put in place, (2) local conditions in the specific 
developing country, (3) the success of the commitments (encouraged 
by the G20) to provide continuing tax administration aid to 
developing countries, (4) the ability of developing countries to make 
necessary domestic changes to participate in the transparency and 
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disclosure options, and (5) the ability of the developing country to 
join the relevant international agreements undergirding the 
transparency and disclosure mechanisms. 
A transparency and disclosure program that makes fewer demands 
on a jurisdiction might be a more feasible first step as the country seeks 
to build its capacity, including its ability to eventually participate in a 
broader array of mechanisms. Thus, as noted earlier,243 BEPS Action 
13 may impose fewer initial burdens on a developing country’s tax 
administration than automatic exchange, which demands that an 
administration exhibit significant capacity to collect, organize, process, 
and distribute data. Local conditions can influence the likelihood of 
whether initial capacity building support will rapidly translate into 
domestic reforms sufficient to meet participation thresholds. 
However, local conditions may also shape a jurisdiction’s views of its 
transparency and disclosure priorities. If a country is more concerned 
about individual tax evasion than multinational tax planning, 
automatic exchange may prove a more valuable tool and one worth 
pursuing. To that end, developing countries could strenuously argue 
for a period of non-reciprocal automatic exchange during which, with 
the professed assistance of the international organizations, they would 
seek to build their administrative and enforcement capacity. 
Given that most of the difficulties faced by developing countries 
in joining the transparency and disclosure trend originate in capacity 
concerns, the commitments made by organizations and developed 
countries in response to the G20’s call for tax administration aid will 
be pivotal. But capacity building is not merely a function of outside 
support and advisors. In reality, it requires domestic commitment on 
multiple fronts to (1) put in place legislation and practices that ensure 
taxpayer privacy and data protection, (2) enact substantive tax laws 
that provide the legal foundation for taxing multinationals and 
individuals, (3) properly train, equip, and compensate a sufficient tax 
enforcement staff, and (4) fund a baseline level of technology and 
infrastructure. Successful capacity building is likely to be the result of 
an integrated approach that combines the guidance and input of 
outside advisors with the internal vision and commitment of the 
national government. 
Part of the challenge for developing countries is navigating 
through regimes that demand a level of infrastructure currently 
 
 243. See supra Section  II.B.2.a. 
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inconsistent with their own reality. They will need to identify those 
adjustments or changes to the deal already struck by the international 
community244 that will allow the new system to meet the needs of 
developing countries without unduly compromising legitimate 
concerns of taxpayers or other jurisdictions. Examples of these 
refinements that have already been articulated include (1) a lower 
threshold for CbC reporting in some regions of the world, presumably 
on the theory that businesses meeting those thresholds are major 
players in the economy 245  and (2) the above-mentioned ability of 
developing countries to participate in automatic exchange of 
information on (at least initially) a nonreciprocal basis.246 
These changes to transparency and disclosure regimes as 
established by the global tax community under the leadership of the 
OECD recognize the multiple ways in which developing countries 
may be different, but can still provide certain basic taxpayer 
protections. Thus, for example, the lower reporting threshold allows 
a subset of developing countries (that may find the major 
multinationals operating in their borders to be smaller in revenue than 
those operating in other regions or sectors) to reasonably benefit from 
an exchange of information program. The Euro threshold set by the 
OECD Action 13 Final Report of Euro 750 million247 represents a 
benchmark for what size multinationals should be expected to provide 
CbC documentation. However, a country’s perspective on the 
threshold at which its businesses might appropriately be asked to 
report is likely a function of the size of the economy and the size of 
the largest businesses operating in that economy. 
Still another possibility is whether some form of public disclosure 
of multinational data, not necessarily identical to the BEPS Action 13 
package, could serve as a compromise for jurisdictions that are unable 
to presently join the groups of nations expected to receive master files, 
local files, and CbC reports due to their inability to satisfy various 
thresholds and join the relevant international agreements. This idea, 
 
 244. On the assumption that for the moment developing countries will not be successful 
in advocating for completely new channels of transparency and disclosure, their better option is 
to advocate for changes in the emerging systems. 
 245. See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 247. See ACTION 13 FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 21. 
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which may have seemed implausible earlier this year (regardless of 
whether it was considered desirable), seems less so now that the 
United Kingdom has taken a step as first mover in that direction.248 
Ultimately, developing countries and those organizations seeking 
to act in their best interests need to explore a three-pronged strategy 
to best position these nations to join any transparency and disclosure 
program that they consider beneficial: (1) domestic legal reforms, (2) 
capacity building—with both its internal and external commitments, 
and (3) contextualization of the transparency and disclosure regimes 
to the realities of developing countries. The third may be especially 
significant as the first two take some time, and may be supported by 
the promise of plausible participation in these new programs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Both the transparency and disclosure trend and the focus on 
developing countries’s substantive tax rules and ability to collect tax 
revenue constitute significant strands in contemporary tax policy. 
Neither is altogether new but both have been the subject of significant 
attention and study in recent years. The current challenge is 
determining how to effectively manage the intersection of both 
strands. Ideally, developing countries (which might benefit most from 
enhanced and more effective tax enforcement) should find a path to 
participation in the new transparency and disclosure programs. Yet as 
detailed above, such participation is contingent on demonstrating 
compliance with a series of legal and administrative requirements that 
some countries may struggle to meet, at least in the short term. The 
decisive question is whether developing countries will find themselves 
shut out of the process, or conversely will be able to access tax 
information through these programs without compromising the 
programs’ integrity. 
Particularly in the case of the poorest jurisdictions, the ability to 
comply not only with the domestic law changes but also with the 
implementation of adequate taxpayer privacy regimes (for both BEPS 
and Automatic exchange) and with adequate information gathering 
and transmitting mechanisms (especially for automatic exchange) 
seems uncertain. Future research can assess the status of developing 
countries under these regimes by determining which and how many 
developing countries have joined in BEPS Action 13 and automatic 
 
 248. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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exchange (which presumably signals that they have implemented the 
minimum level of domestic law changes required). We can then 
evaluate the experiences of these countries after they have tried to join 
or fully participate in the transparency and disclosure programs. 
Finally, the formal re-evaluation of the BEPS Project in 2020 offers 
another window into the mid-term effects of a trend that is just taking 
hold. Ultimately, however, if the transparency and disclosure trend 
proves successful and enables participating jurisdictions to more 
effectively administer their tax systems, the failure to incorporate 
developing countries into the process could widen the gap 
between  developed and developing countries, with notable 
distributional  consequences. 
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